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RÉSUMÉ 
Le  but  de  cette  étude  est  de  servir  comme  un  véhicule  exploratoire 
présentant l'une des questions épineuses en matière de planification fiscale 
globale et de sa mise en œuvre par des États individuels, celle des prix de 
transfert et de l'utilisation de ces juridictions d'hébergement. L'étude vise à 
démontrer la complexité  des  mécanismes  fiscaux  qui entourent le  sujet, 
principalement en utilisant de la jurisprudence et des analyses juridiques, 
ainsi  que  des  rapports  de  comptabilité,  des  rapports  financiers  et  des 
enquêtes journalistiques.  Ce  faisant,  l'ouvrage  présente  de  prouver  que 
malgré la volonté politique manifeste de changer le cadre actuel, le  statu 
quo  est  susceptible  de  rester,  bénéficiant  ainsi  aux  entreprises 
multinationales au détriment des économies des États individuels. 
Le  travail est divisé en trois chapitres essentiels et distincts, dont chacun 
joue  un  rôle  essentiel  dans  la  reconstruction  de  la  grande  image  de 
stratégies d'évasion fiscale globale. 
Le  premier chapitre définit les paradis fiscaux et leur utilisation,  illustre 
leurs origines, ainsi que leur évolution jusqu'aux temps modernes et étudie 
les  questions  problématiques  qui  entourent  leurs  opérations, 
particulièrement dans le contexte des activités des entreprises.  Ce faisant, 
cette étude tente de démontrer les deux côtés du débat sur les techniques 
de minimisation des impôts et de leur impact à  la fois  sur les économies 
'onshore' et 'offshore'. 
Le  deuxième  chapitre  présente  une  analyse  plus  technique  des  prix  de 
transfert, une méthode particulière utilisée par les entreprises pour réduire 
leur  fardeau  fiscal.  Sous  cette  rubrique,  une  analyse  approfondie  des 
méthodes et fonctions de prix de transfert est proposé, en mettant l'accent 
sur le contexte nord-américain. 
Dans le  dernier chapitre,  l'application pratique des techniques de prix de 
transfert est illustrée par une étude d'un cas particulier de la corporation 
Starbucks, qui a réussi d'utiliser la comptabilité complexe inter-entreprises 
à  travers plusieurs juridictions afin  d'éviter  de payer des impôts sur ces 
profits à travers le monde. 
Mots des : Prix de transfert - paradis fiscaux - évasion fiscale -
minimisation fiscale - compagnies multinationaux viii 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this work is to serve as an exploratory vehicle outlining one 
of the thorny issues in global tax planning and domestic implementation 
within individual states, that of transfer pricing and the use of these shelter 
jurisdictions.  The  study  purports  to  demonstrate  the  complexity  of tax 
mechanisms  surrounding the  subject matter,  chiefly through  the use of 
legal precedents and analysis, as well as of the accounting, financial and 
journalistic reports.  In doing so,  the work sets to  prove that despite the 
manifest political will to change the existing framework, the status quo is 
likely  to  remain,  thus  benefiting  the  multinational  enterprises  at  the 
expense of individual state economies. 
This study is split into three essential and distinct chapters, each playing 
an integral  part in reconstructing the  big picture  of global  tax avoiding 
strategies. 
The first chapter defines tax havens and their uses, illustrates their origins, 
their  evolution  into  modern  times,  and  studies  problematic  issues  that 
surround their operations, particularly in the context of corporate activity. 
In doing so, this study tries to demonstrate both sides of the debate on tax 
minimization techniques and their impact on both the  onshore and the 
offshore economies. 
The second chapter presents a more technical analysis of transfer pricing, a 
particular method employed by corporations to minimize their tax burden. 
Under  this  rubric,  a  thorough  analysis  of transfer pricing  methods and 
functions is offered, with emphasis on the North American context. 
In  the  final  chapt  er,  the  practical  application  of  the  transfer  pncmg 
techniques  is illustrated through  a  specifie  case  study of the  Starbucks 
Corporation,  which has succeeded in using intricate inter-firm accounting 
throughout several jurisdictions to avoid paying taxes on their worldwide 
profits. 
Key words: transfer pricing - tax havens - tax avoidance - tax 
minimization- multinational enterprises ix 
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xi INTRODUCTION 
"Every  man  is  entitled 
if he  can  to  order  his 
affairs  so  that the  tax 
attaching  under  the 
appropriate  Acts  is 
less  than  it  otherwise 
would be. "J 
"Tax  is  the  priee  of 
civilization.  Tax havens 
are  the  priee  of 
globalization. "2 
Over the years, the international financial services industry has 
been  witnessing  a  steady  climb  in  competition  among  the  financial 
centers,  which  strive  to  mobilize  global  capital  flows  by  supplying 
various incentives to  private and corporate investors.  These  financial 
centers  rely  on  the  principle  of  state  sovereignty  and  develop  tax 
policies, which allow them to finance their own national social programs 
and at the same time,  to  offer competitive financial instruments and 
incentives  to  foreign  nationals.  By taxing certain incarne  or capitals, 
financial  centers  impact  capital  flows  of  local  and  foreign-sourced 
incarne and on investment patterns, to the point where their decisions 
start carrying a  political  dimension,  turning their  domestic  decisions 
into a power struggle on the arena of international financial activity. 
IRC v.  Duke of  Westminster (1936) 19 TC 490, [1936] AC 1. 
Ganapati Bhat, "Transfer pricing, tax havens and global govemance," Discussion 
Paper, Bonn: Deutsches 
Institut fiir Entwicklungspolitik, 2009 at  1. 2 
What gets taxed and at what rate is intrinsically linked to the 
State's  positioning  on  the  international  scene,  where  inter-state 
competition, as well as capital and operational movement has opened 
doors to shopping for tax forums. 
As such, the economie globalization that has marked the second 
part of the  2Qth  century has manifested itself through the increased 
capital  and  product  mobility  across  the  state  frontiers.  It  was 
accompanied  by  the  deregulation  of  financial  markets  and  was 
facilitated by innovations in telecommunications, which have effectively 
reduced  the  costs  for  information  transfer  and  access,  as  well  as 
transactional costs of capital transfers. With these changes present, the 
businesses are no longer tied to a  single location and can shift their 
base  of  operations  with  ease  to  a  forum  that  offers  less  costly  or 
restrictive conditions. As  such, entrepreneurs choose to maximize their 
profits  and  reduce  their  tax  liabilities  by  directing  the  increasingly 
mobile capital flows  towards the low or no tax jurisdictions, effectively 
sheltering their returns from the elevated domestic taxes. 
lt is on the wave of the financial globalization and deregulation 
that these tax-shelter jurisdictions,  born out of strife for successfully 
creating an attractive investment climate,  entities  known  as  offshore 
financial centers or tax havens, have sprung to life,  both drifting from 
and being demonized by state actors. 
In  trying  to  properly  assess  the  big  picture,  whereby  the 
evermore  sophisticated  demands  for  financial  services  of  powerful 3 
individuals and corporations are met by tax havens, while the latter are 
being chastised  by the powerful onshore jurisdietions for the billions in 
their lost government revenues, one needs to understand the challenges 
posed  by  sovereignty  concerns,  as  well  as  privacy  regulations  and 
questions  encountered  in  tax  haven  jurisdictions;  moreover,  an 
understanding of tax treatment of a  particular national jurisdiction is 
required as a  case study of particular omission of the international tax 
regime. After all, does "Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi"3  standard apply 
to the enactment of restraining domestic policies: if developed countries 
rule  in  the  favour  of the  sophisticated  taxpayer,  can  they  possibly 
demand  a  more  restrictive  approach  from  their  developing 
counterparts? Uniform standards are difficult to produce and transfer 
them  to  different  territories  unaltered.  In  other  words,  adjustment 
process is necessary. However, it requires a substantial time period and 
in  sorne  cases  process  of  adjustment  is  unattainable  due  to  the 
unyielding opposition from within the state.4 That being said, it would 
be  worthy  to  note  that academies  differ  in  their  perceptions  of the 
tangible politieal and economie impact of global initiatives, while sorne 
prediet  the  eventual  demise  of  economie  concessions  for  resident 
corporations of the OFCs under the global pressure,s while sorne of the 
others,6  state that OFCs currently  hold the upper hand in the struggle 
for economie sovereignty and its multi-million dollar benefits that OFCs 
benefit from as a consequence. 
4 
Latin maxim, which translates into "What's allowed to Jupiter isn't allowed to ox." 
Brittain-Catlin, infra note 120 at 24. 
Jorri C. Duursma, "Tax Havens and International Law", (2008) J.I.B.L.R. vol. 23, no. 
6, at 345. 
See  J.C. Sharman, Havens in a storm: strugglefor global tax regulation (Comell 
University Press: New York, 2006). 4 
Any attempt at changing the status quo, would a priori counter 
the  aforementioned  de-regularization  trend,  and  thus  requires  a 
significant effort and unison amongst those wishing to change it. That 
being said, prior to discussing any attempt at unity, one has to keep in 
mind  the  strong  dissenting  voices  of  geographically  smaller  states, 
which  became  OFCs  in an  attempt  to  circumvent  their  geo-political 
vulnerability,  caused by the constraints of having a  limited domestic 
market size and high transportation costs  of doing transactions with 
onshore  markets.?  As  such,  in  arder  to  address  their  developmental 
problems associated with their colonial past and location, these states 
choose to benefit from inter-state cooperation with similar states,s  as 
well as to go against mainstream thinking in economies, opting for the 
economie  niches  (such  as  selling  sovereignty  attributes  such  as 
passports,  fishing rights,  shipping registries  and domain names)  and 
choosing to  invest  into  technological infrastructure  development.  g  By 
the  same  token,  small  OFC  states  defend  their  financial  policies 
through  pressure  groups  of  non-governmental  actors,  such  as  the 
International Tax and Investment Organisation (hereinafter ITIO)  and 
Center for  Freedom and Prosperity, JO  both publishing in favour of and 
providing forums for promoting tax competition and protecting privacy 
of investments. 
9 
10 
Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw, The Diplomacies ofSmall States: Between 
Vulnerability and 
Resilience, International Political Economy Series (Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, 
2009) at 3. 
A vibrant example of  such cooperation is the Caribbean Community initiative 
(hereafter CARICOM); for their free market project, see online: 
<http:/  /www.caricom.org/jsp/single  market/single  market  index.jsp?menu=csme>. 
Cooper & Shaw, supra note 7 at 6. 
See online: <http://www.itio.org> and <http://www.freedomandprosperity.org>. 5 
The purpose of this work is to serve as an exploratory vehicle in 
the world of global tax planning, with a particular emphasis on transfer 
pricing through the use of these shelter jurisdictions, all whilst keeping 
in mind their role in the development of international and domestic tax 
policies dealing with foreign investment. By tracing the evolution of tax 
haven jurisdictions and their uses, the study aims to demonstrate that 
the question of whether any  real, tangible change is foreseeable in the 
near  future  with  respect  to  the  corporate  use  of  these  offshore 
jurisdiction cannot be answered in the affirmative.  By the same token, 
this study attempts to illuminate the harmful effects of tax competition, 
with respect toits damaging consequences to state economies resulting 
in tax revenue losses by drawing on specifie case studies. Furthermore, 
the  work  discusses  the  existing  global  initiatives  dealing  with  tax 
competition and regulatory tools that they offer in addressing the issues 
of tax evasion and of the illicit use of tax regimes, all whist attempting 
to  demonstrate that tax shelter jurisdictions will  effectively live  on in 
the light of the impotency of the international community to come up 
with  an  exhaustive  unified  global  initiative  to  regulate  their  capital 
flows. 
The work is split into three essential and distinct  chapters, each 
playing an integral part in reconstructing the big picture of global tax 
avoiding strategies. As  such, the first chapter takes  the reader back to 
the origins of tax havens, defines them, traces their evolution to modern 
times  and  studies  thorny  issues  that  surround  their  operations, 
particularly  in  the  context of  corporate  activity.  The  second  chapter 
presents  a  more  technical  analysis  of transfer  pricing,  a  particular 
method employed by corporations to minimize their tax burden. Under 
this  rubric,  a  thorough  analysis  of  transfer  pricing  methods  and 6 
functions is offered, with emphasis on the North American context, and 
the methodology used is slightly different from the other two parts, as 
various accounting and business references are heavily relied on. In the 
final chapter, methodology of the works reverts back to legal discipline, 
though  journalistic  inquiries  are  used  to  illustrate  the  practical 
application of the transfer pricing techniques. CHAPTER 1 
ANALYZING THE HISTORIC ROLE OF TAX HAVENS AND 
DEFINING THE GLOBAL TAX PLANNING CHALLENGE 
Tax havens or the offshore financial centers  (hereinafter OFCs) 
have  a  marked  presence  in  evecy  corner  of  the  world,  employing 
thousands of people from the air-conditioned skyscrapers of South East 
Asia  and  the  Middle  East,  to  the  trusted  European  financial 
institutions, to New Jersey's and Delaware's financial districts  and to 
the busy hubs of activity spread along the Caribbean shores. Despite 
the  occasional international  campaigns  to  scrutinize  and  limit  their 
activities, the demand for the financial services that they offer, seems to 
inevitably point to the ineffectiveness of such efforts and to serve as a 
testament their ever present popularity and utility. This part is meant 
as an overview of the types of offshore financial structures and of the 
concerns that they generate in the global financial system. 
1.1  Definitions: the gospel by the OECD 
So what is a tax haven? The concept has been defined differently 
by  various  competent  sources  on  the  matter,  but  it  should  be 
immediately pointed out that no single definition has been agreed upon. 
Instead,  most  authors  writing  on  the  matter  tend  to  focus  their 8 
discussions on the parameters of banking secrecy and preferential tax 
treatment,11  a  position which is  reflected in the  terms used  by large 
international organisations,  involved  in matters  of global  wealth and 
taxation. 
As  such,  the  Organization  for  Economie  Cooperation  and 
Development (hereinafter OECD),  arguably  the most cited and revered 
authority on matters pertaining to offshore jurisdictions, has limited its 
definition of tax havens to four criteria12: 
1.  No or nominal taxation on the relevant incarne 
2.  Lack of effective exchange of information for tax purposes 
3.  Lack  of  transparency  of  the  tax  or  regulatory  regime  (e.g. 
excessive  banking  secrecy;  inadequate  access  to  beneficiai 
ownership  information),  which may  limit  the  availability  of,  or 
the access to, information when it is needed for tax examinations 
or investigations 
4.  Lack  of  requirement  that  activities  be  substantial  (e.g.  shell 
companies) 
Prior to engaging in a discussion of these factors or criteria, it would 
be noteworthy to comment on the status of the OECD in the realm of 
Il 
12 
See for example, Hoyt L.  Barber, Tax Havens: How to Bank, Invest and Do Business -
Offshore and Tax 
Free (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992) at 4. 
Jeffrey Owens, "Offshore Tax Evasion: The Role ofExchange oflnformation" (Speech 
delivered at Concurrence Fiscal, Enjeux et Prospective conference Montreal, September 
2007)  [unpublished].  For  a  more  comprehensive  discussion of the  criteria,  see  the 
Organization  for  Economie  Cooperation  and  Development,  online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmfultaxpractices/taxhavencriteria.htm>. 9 
international tax law, given the frequent references to its expertise that 
will  be  employed  by  this  work.  This  51  year  old  organizations  has 
extended  membership  to  34  countries,  including  major  developed 
countries. It positions itself as an entity dedicated to "promote policies 
that will improve the economie and social well-being of people around 
the  world,"  by  partnering  with  its  members  in  measuring  various 
economie parameters,  such as  productivity and global flows  of trade 
and investment,  and subsequently by setting international standards 
on a wide range of issues, including international taxation. 13  Despite the 
high profile standing of the organization, it is an advisory body, and the 
legal status of its recommendations,  particularly of the  Commentaries 
on the OECD ModeZ Tax Convention in Income and Capital, 14 is subject of 
the ongoing academie debate, fuelled in part by the non-homogenous 
application of this document to  the interpretation and application of 
bilateral tax treaties around the world. 
Without going into  specifie  arguments on the  matter, which were 
famously brought to the table by the most prominent academies during 
the Leiden Conference in 2006,Js it will  suffice to say that the OECD 
Commentaries  have  gained  an  almost  customary  law  standing,  and 
even  in  the  absence  of  a  direct  application,  serve  as  "authentic 
13 
14 
15 
Organization for Economie Cooperation and Development, online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/about/>. 
The most recent update of the Convention took place in July 201 O.  See OECD, OECD 
Approves Updates to Mode! Tax Convention, Transfer Pricing Guide/ines and Report 
on Attribution of  Profits to Permanent Establishments, (Paris: OECD, 201 0), online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en  2649  37989746  45689428  1  1  1  1,0 
O.html>. 
For a comprehensive report on the conference, see Monica Erasmus-Koen & Sjoerd 
Douma, "Legal Status of  the OECD Commentaries - In Search of  the Holy Grail of 
International Tax Law", 61  Bulletin for International Taxation 8 (2007), at 339-352. 10 
guidance"  to  domestic  courts  and  tax  administrators,1 6  making 
themselves into a force to be reckoned with in all matters pertaining to 
international financial planning. 
More importantly for the subject matter of this work, over more than 
two decades the OECD has published extensively on the subject of tax 
havens,  and has documented its position through various  initiatives, 
striving  to  modify  corporate  codes  of  conduct,  particularly  those 
affecting the cross-border transactions of multinational corporations, as 
well as encouraging governments of its member states to enact tough 
legislation to combat the  illegal international fiscal  practices such as 
money laundering and tax evasion.  In fact,  OECD has been explicitly 
called upon by the G-7, G-8 and G-20 members during their respective 
summits in the recent years to take measures to curtail the activities of 
tax heavens,  with the 2009  London Summit's  communiqué famously 
stating that the G-20 countries 
"  ...  stand  ready  to  take  agreed  action  against  non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, including tax havens. We stand ready to deploy sanctions 
to protect our public finances and financial systems. The era of banking 
secrecy is over."11 
And indeed, with the global financial crisis looming at the time of 
the London Summit, coupled with tax scandals in financial institutions 
in Switzerland and Lichtenstein18  which are particularly interesting to 
16 
17 
18 
Sjoerd Douma & Frank Engelen, eds., The Legal Status of  the OECD Commentaries 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2008) at 193. 
G-20, Summit Communiqué, "Global Plan for Recovery and Reform" (April 2, 2009). 
For a succinct summary of these developments, see James K. Jackson, "The OECD 
Initiative on Tax Havens," United States Congressional Research Service, (March 
l 11 
analyze through the prism of the rubric of banking secrecy, contained 
in  the  third  part  of this  work,  have  prompted  the  OECD,  amongst 
others,19 to toughen its discourse on international tax crimes and the 
use of tax havens even further. 
Having said this, going back to the four abovementioned OECD 
criteria defining tax havens, it should be stated from the onset that the 
first  criterion  of  tax-free  regimes  or  of  nominal-taxes,  most  often 
associated with tax havens, is not sufficient in itself to characterize the 
jurisdiction as a tax haven. This is chiefly due to OECD's recognition of 
any jurisdiction's  right  to  determine  the  tax rate  appropriate  for  its 
needs.2o  However, it should be noted that low or no taxation regimes 
have a  tendency to be construed as harmful in the presence of what is 
known  as  "ring-fencing"  or  a  legislatively  enacted  two-tier  taxation 
system, which separates locally owned enterprises and those owned by 
non-residents, essentially making the latter insulated from the domestic 
economy.21  With respect to the last criterion for the identification of tax 
19 
20 
21 
2010), online: 
<http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/1  0207/bitstreams/19418  Previous  Version  201 
0-03-11.pdf> at 3. 
The Financial Stability Board is another competent international body, which monitors 
the implementation of the  G-20  recommendations and following the  Seoul Summit of 
2010, it has  issued a comprehensive report on  the progress of the states of adaptation 
and  implementation of the  global  fmancial  policy  initiatives  of the  G-20,  pertaining 
inter alia  to  the  shadow  banking  system,  so  widely  used  within  the  context of tax 
havens and especially so, for the purposes of illicit activities occurring therein. For the 
full text, see Financial Stability Board,  Overview of  Progress in the Implementation of 
the  G20  Recommendations  for  Strengthening  Financial  Stability,  (Base!:  FSB,  4 
November  2011 ),  online: 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r  111104gg.pdf>,  with  emphasis 
on pages  11 ff. 
Hunt, infra note 76. 
Tim Bennett, International initiatives affectingfinancial havens (London: Trolley 
2002) at 68. 
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havens,  the  lack  of real  activity  has  been  introduced  in  1998  and 
focuses on the systemic requirements of a  given jurisdiction, which is 
more prone to be classified as a tax haven, should its setup be based on 
the  expectation  of attracting  investments  and  transactions  that  are 
directed only to receive a tax benefit. 
The bread and butter issue thus rests with the two remaining 
criteria, which respectively deal with information exchange and with the 
overall transparency.  With respect to the latter,  originally,  the  OECD 
has divided tax havens into two  sub-groups; the  first,  leaning in the 
direction  toward  greater  transparency  and  of  established  effective 
exchange of information on tax matters, and the second, who simply 
would  not  cooperate.  This  last  sub-group  has  included  only  three 
jurisdictions: Andorra, Principality of Liechtenstein and Principality of 
Monaco, which in May 2009 have been redeemed by OECD's Committee 
on  Fiscal  Affairs  as  a  result  of  commitments  they  each  made  "to 
implement the OECD standards of transparency and effective exchange 
of information and the timetable they each set for  implementation."22 
The  aforementioned  exchange  of information,  the  OECD  calls  upon 
states to  adhere  to  the  principle  of the  exchange  of information  "on 
demand," whereby the competent authority of one country would asks 
the  competent  authority  of  the  jurisdiction  in  question  for  the 
information in connection with certain tax review, mainly in accordance 
with  the  bilateral  agreement  on  the  exchange  of  information  made 
between countries. 
22  Jackson, supra note 18 at 3. 13 
In fact, there is much to be said about the de jure foundations of 
such disclosures.  As  such,  the Article  26 of the  2003 version of the 
OECD Model Tax Treaty23 sets the standard for exchange of information, 
whereby  under  its  first  part,  it  essentially  demands  that  state 
authorities  abide  by information  disclosure requests;  however,  under 
the second part, it provides three notable exceptions, whereby one is a 
public arder exception, and the other two,  makes the first part of the 
article inapplicable when in conflict with the laws and administrative 
practices of the state under inquiry. Thus, at a  first glanee, it would 
seem  that  if  a  state  decides  to  legislate  in  favour  of  banking  and 
commercial  secrecy,  it  protects  its  foreign  investors  from  the  forced 
extraction of information by their home states and respects their rights 
and privileges, including the, albeit not universally recognized, privilege 
against  self-incrimination.  However,  when  states  sign  bilateral  Tax 
Information  Exchange  Agreements  (hereinafter  TIEAs),  as  almost  all 
jurisdictions considered as tax havens have clone  in the recent years, 
they  essentially  formally  commit  themselves  to  renouncing  these 
exceptions, obviously, subject to legal fine-tuning. 
Having  said  this,  what  most  commentators  on  the  subject, 
including the OECD, find challenging is the de facto implementation of 
the norms under these agreements, as sorne offshore jurisdictions have 
practical compliance problems. By the same token, the very language of 
the aforementioned article leaves room for manoeuvre, as it focuses on 
the obligation to provide information obtained using the jurisdiction's 
information  gathering  measures  (emphasis  added),  which  allows  the 
23  OECD, Articles of  the Mode! Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital, (Paris: OECD, 
2003), online <http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxtreaties/1914467 .pdf> at 23. 14 
jurisdiction in question simply to omit collecting the required  type of 
data "by not erecting the procedures necessary to collect such data." 24 
There  is  more  silver-lining  when  it  cornes  to  the  disclosure 
requirements, which have been successfully argued in the past by the 
taxpayers  in  front  of  courts  and  tribunals.  Various  additional 
safeguards, such as the prohibition against what is known as "fishing" 
by state authorities, have been argued.2s  By the same token, unlike the 
TIEAs,  which  are  in  principle  non-binding  agreements,  the  double-
taxation  treaties  (hereinafter  DTAs)  have  also  been enacted  by most 
states and constitute arrangements for mutual assistance in enforcing 
tax daims internationally,  albeit with certain in-built limitations  and 
restrictions. Also, on the subject of TIEAs, their effectiveness is further 
undermined by the fact that in the majority of cases, the exchanged 
information  is  precluded  from  being  given  to  governments  not 
concerned by the agreement, as well as by the fact that they tend to be 
made between the tax haven jurisdictions and the developed economies, 
thereby excluding the developing economies from the process.26 
Similarly, under this rubric of definitions, one must not overlook 
another colossus,  the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter IMF), 
which  complements  the  broader  OECD  view  on the  notion  of a  tax 
haven. As it is mentioned previously, tax havens are often seen as being 
24 
25 
26 
Jackson, supra note 18 at 11. 
Sharman, supra note 6 at 240. 
Cal Ledsham, ''Tax Havens - a Moral Problem, a Financial Leak" (2008), online: 
< http :/  /www. yarrainstitute.org.au/Portals/0/  docs/Publications/Tax%20ha  vens09.  pdf> 
at 5. --------------------------
15 
synonymous with the term offshore financial center, which is defined by 
the IMF as a: 
"center where the bulk of financial center activity is offshore on both 
sides of the balance sheet (that is the counter parties of the majority of 
financial  institutions' liabilities  and  assets  are  non-residents),  where 
the transactions are initiated elsewhere, and where the majority of the 
institutions involved are controlled by non-residents."21 
This  definition  intertwines  with  the  transparency  criterion 
expressed by the OECD, as it stems out of the fact that tax laws are 
applied openly and consistently to  the  corporate entities  and private 
individuals  in the  same area and these  possess  the  information and 
documentation  required  by  the  tax  authorities  to  determine  the 
correctness of the calculation of tax liabilities. Moreover, this definition, 
or rather the term OFC, is a more appropriate and general definition, as 
it  intrinsically  recognizes  a  jurisdiction's  right  to  provide  specifie 
facilities to carry out commercial and financial activities. 
Finally,  it  should  be  said  that  practically  speaking,  both 
definitions point to the fact that the main raison-d'être of the offshore 
territories or jurisdictions is the desire of a company or an individual to 
decrease the tax burden in their home jurisdictions by, in the case of 
corporate entities, transferring their activities into more favourable tax 
regimes,  which  provide  a  confidentiality  regime  vis-à-vis  the  true 
owners of the company, and which are often associated with more lax 
requirements under the local corporate, antitrust, and banking laws. 
27  International Monetary Fund, Offshore Financial Centers-The Rote of  the !MF, 
Background Paper, SM/00/136 (Washington: IMF, 23 June 2000) at 3. 16 
1.2  List ofTax Havens: Who made the eut 
Around the time of the pivotai date in 2008, when the meeting of 
the  UN  Committee  of  Experts  on  International  Cooperation  in  Tax 
Matters took place, prompting the exchange of information on request 
in all tax matters for  the administration and enforcement of domestic 
tax law "without regard to a  domestic tax interest requirement or bank 
secrecy  for tax purposes," whilst outlining extensive safeguards aimed 
to protect the confidentlality of the information exchanged,2s  the United 
States  Government Accountability  Office  has  issued  a  report  to  the 
country's  Congress,  in  which  it  has  thoroughly  analyzed  the 
involvement of major US corporations with the recognized tax havens. 
In it, the authors of the report offer one of the most comprehensive lists 
of financial havens  available.  It  includes  not only those jurisdictions 
that are recognized by the OECD by virtue of fulfilling their four criteria, 
but  also  those  that  offer  tax  incentives  in  a  similar  manner  to  tax 
havens,  while  not  being  traditionally  associated  with  them.  These 
jurisdictions are also mentioned in a  work29  published for the National 
Bureau of Economie Research, largely dedicated to the analysis of the 
internai factors, which make jurisdictions more susceptible to becoming 
tax havens.  The work essentially cornes  to the conclusion that other 
than a  relatively small population of under a  million, good governance 
is  a  key  factor  that  creates  a  favorable  investment  environment, 
28 
29 
OECD, A Progress Report On The Jurisdictions Surveyed By The OECD Global Forum 
in Implementing the International/y Agreed Tax Standard, (Paris: OECD,  December 5 
2012 ), online:  <http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmfultaxpractices/43606256.pdf>. 
Dhammika Dharmapala, James R. Hines Jr.,"Which Countries Become Tax Havens?" 
National Bureau Of  Economie Research (May 2009), online: 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2802>. 17 
whereby  the  quality  of governance  includes  "measures  of voice  and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
and  the  control  of  corruption,"  and  guarantees  higher  foreign 
investment flows. 3o 
Table 1.2  Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial 
Privacy Jurisdictions and the Sources of  Those 
Jurisdictions31 
Jurisdiction  Organization 
for Economie 
Co-operation 
and 
Developmen  t 
National  u.s. 
30 
31 
32 
Ibid at  1. 
Bureau of  District 
Economie  Court 
Research32  order 
gran  ting 
leave for 
IRS to 
serve a 
"John 
Doe" 
summons33 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), International Taxation: 
Large US. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions 
Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions, GA0-09-157 (Washington, 
D.C.: GAO, Dec. 2008). 
The organization, founded in 1920, positions itself as United States' leading nonprofit 
organization for economie research, dedicated to "disserninating unbiased economie 
research among public policymakers,  business professionals, and the academie 
community," online: < http://www.nber.org/info.html >. 
As  it is  mentioned in the  GAO  report,  ibid.  note  31  at  11, a John Doe summons is a 
third-party summons that does not identify the person with respect to whose tax liability 
the summons is  issued and may be served only after a court proceeding. A third-party 
summons is  a summons requesting information on a person or persons other than the 
recipient of  the summons. To obtain a John Doe summons, the United  States  must 
establish that  (1)  the  summons  relates  to  the  investigation of a particular person  or 
ascertainable  group  or class of persons whose  identity is  unknown,  (2)  there is  a 
reasonable basis for believing that such  person or group  or  class  of persons  may 18 
Andorra  XA  x 
Anguilla  x  x  x 
Antigua and Barbuda  x  x  XB 
Aruba  x  XB 
Bahamas  x  x  XB 
Bahr  ain  x  x 
Bar  bad  os  x  XB 
Belize  x  x  x 
Bermuda  x  x  XB,C 
British Virgin Islands  x  x  xo 
Cayman Islands  x  x  XB 
Cook Islands  x  x  x 
Costa Rica  XB 
Cyprus  x  x  xc 
Dominica  x  x  XB 
Gibraltar  x  x  x 
Gre  nada  x  x  XB 
Guernsey  x  xo  XB,E 
Hong Kong  x  x 
Ire  land  x 
fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of  any  internai  revenue  law, 
and  (3)  the information sought to  be obtained from  the examination of the records or 
testimony  and  the  identity  of  the  John  Doe(s)  is  not  readily  available  from  other 
sources. See United States Code (U.S.C.), 2006 Ed., Supplement 4, Title 26  - Internai 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C, § 7609(f). 19 
Isle ofMan  x  x  XB 
Jersey  x  xo  XB 
Jordan  x 
Latvia  xc 
Le banon  x 
Liberia  x  x 
Liechtenstein  XA  x  x 
Luxembourg  x  xc 
Macao  x 
Maldives  x 
Malta  x  x  x 
Marshall Islands  x  x 
Mauritius  x 
Monaco  XA  x 
Montserrat  x  x 
Nauru  x  x 
Netherlands Antilles  x  x  XB 
Niue  x 
Panama  x  x  x 
Samoa  x  x 
San Marino  x 
Seychelles  x 
Singapore  x  xc 
St. Kitts and Nevis  x  x  x 20 
St. Lucia  X  x 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  X  x  x 
Switzerland  x  xc 
Turks and Caicos Islands  x  x  x 
U.S. Virgin Islands  x 
Vanuatu  x  x  x 
Sources: OECD, NBER, and John Doe summons. 
A These are uncooperative tax havens; the remaining are comrnitted jurisdictions. 
B A Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA)  is in force between the United States 
and this jurisdiction. 
C  A  double  tax  treaty  is  in  force  with  an  exchange  of information  provision.  For 
Switzerland, the treaty provides that the competent authorities of the contracting states 
shall exchange such information as is necessary "for the prevention of tax fraud or the 
like." 
D  NBER's  list  included  the  Channel  Islands.  Jersey  and  Guernsey are  part of the 
Channel Islands. The two other sources we used to identify tax havens listed Jersey and 
Guernsey as two separate tax havens and did not include the Channel Islands on their 
lists  of tax havens.  To  be consistent,  we  are  including Jersey and  Guernsey as  tax 
havens on the bureau's list rather than the Channel Islands. 
E  The  John  Doe  summons  lists  Guernsey  1  Sark/  Alderney.  OECD  only  included 
Guernsey.  Since  Sark  and  Alderney  are  part  of  the  Bailiwick  of  Guernsey,  to  be 
consistent, we are only including Guernsey on our list of tax havens. 
F The TIEA  signed by the United States and St. Lucia on January 30,  1987, is not in 
effect within the meaning of section 274(h)(6)(A)(i) of the lnternal Revenue Code because 
the government of St. Lucia has not enacted legislation to implement the agreement. 
As  it  was  previously  said,  since  the  publication  of  the 
aforementioned  report,  the term "uncooperative  tax haven"  has been 
abolished in 2009, as Andorra,  Liechtenstein and Monaco have been 
absolved  by  OECD,  given  their  commitment  to  adherence  to  its  tax 
stai:tdards. That being said, not much has changed since that time, as 
can be seen from the OECD's own assessment of the implementation of 
its suggested norms in tax matters; to this day, the list of jurisdictions 
that "have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, but 
have  not yet substantially implemented"  boast 30 contenders, which 21 
include  most  of the  most  well  known  OFCs,  such  as  the  Cayman 
Islands, Belize and Liechtenstein.34  Moreover, if one sets to examine the 
OECD  progress  reports  and  particularly,  their  most  recent,  2012 
publication on the status of their plight to increase transparency  and 
foster fiscal information exchange between states, one cannat help but 
notice that the tactics used to achieve this goallargely boil down to peer 
reviews and signing of not legally binding agreements, with no tangible 
result to account.3s  Hence, the 2009 list, standards and aspirations are 
sadly still as applicable and relevant as they were then. 
1.3  OFC origins and development 
Tax haven jurisdictions are not tied to a specifie geographie area, 
nor can they credit their creation to a  particular circumstance. While 
Jersey and Guemsey  islands have enjoyed the low tax area status for 
centuries,  ever  since  the  British  Crown  has  bequeathed  them  with 
charters  that  exempted  them  from  English  taxes,  Lichtenstein  has 
carved itself a  noteworthy niche by developing significant expertise in 
the area of trusts, having enacted  its  first trust legislation in  1926,36 
and  Singapore  is  currently  emerging  as  the  fastest-growing  private 
banking sector, increasing its asset growth from $150 billion in 1998 to 
an astonishing $1.173 trillion by the end of 2007.37 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Ibid note 19. 
OECD, The Global Forum on Transparency And  Exchange Of  Information For Tax 
Purposes, (Paris: OECD, April 2012), online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmfultaxpractices/43757434.pdt> at 3. 
Supra, Jackson note 17, at 4. 
Loma Bourke, Citywire "Tax evasion crackdown expected"  (15 February 2009), 
online: <http://www.citywire.eo.uk/money/tax-evasion-crackdown-expected/a329338>. 22 
That being said, the origins of the modern OFCs can primarily be 
traced to three sources;  first,  it is the post-colonial  states that trace 
their  history  to  the  British Empire.  These,  for  the  large  part,  island 
nations,  which include  Crown  Dependencies,  Pacifie  atolls,  Overseas 
Territories,  as well  as the former  British domains  of Hong-Kong and 
Singapore,3s  were granted independence and historically have benefited 
from tax exemptions and were granted special status by the colonizing 
state.  In the  post-World  War  II  tax policy  development these states 
have  played upon their  sovereign  status  to  introduce  foreign-income 
friendly  fiscal  policies.  Second,  it is  the  European centers  that offer 
specialization in private banking and as financial affiliates, and finally, 
the sui generis category of OFCs that regroups such different players as 
Dubaï  and  Uruguay,  which  have  started  to  enact  laws  aimed  at 
attracting  foreign  capital  in  the  recent  decades.  Having said  this,  a 
special mention should be awarded to the post World War II  capital of 
the British Empire, since London's City banks have played a crucial role 
in  restructuring  the  global  financial  services.  Their  influence  will 
alluded to at several instances throughout this work. 
Historically,  tax havens trace  their origins all the way back to 
antiquity, whereby in ancient Greece, in order to avoid the 2% imported 
goods  tax,  merchants stored their goods on the islands near Athena. 
Subsequently, the Vatican and the cities of the Hanseatic League in the 
Middle Ages became prosperous by, in the former case, serving as safe 
haven  for  papal riches,  and in  the  latter,  by receiving  favorable  tax 
treatment for their commercial activities.39 
38 
39 
Bennett, supra note 21 at 4. 
Tun Nin Wu, "Theory and Operation of a Modem National Economy: Tax Havens" 23 
More recently though, the very idea of a  tax haven goes all the 
way back to  the  French Revolution of 1789, which gave  birth to  the 
Swiss banking secrecy laws  in an attempt by the  rich to store  away 
their wealth safely and discreetly. The centuries old tradition has been 
further  reinforced  in  the  2Qth  century,  whereby  Switzerland  has 
specifically legislated in its 1934 Bank Act4o to make it a criminal offence 
to disclose banking information to foreign governments and has opted 
for a  very restricted view of what constitutes tax evasion.4 I  Since then, 
the newly sovereign states that became referred to as tax havens have 
essentially  copied  the  Swiss  example,  but  what  has  made  this 
remarkable is the immensity of the effect the politics of these individual 
states,  sometimes  seen  as  the  "unintended  consequence  of bungled 
decolonisation," has had and continues to have on the world economy, 
and which  separates  it  from  sheer  subsidies  and  fiscal  concessions 
used  by  most  states  in  arder  to  attract  foreign  investment  to  a 
particular industry.42 
In the more recent history, the rise of the offshore finance, which 
has really gained the momentum in the 1960s, is attributable to several 
factors;  first, it is the ex-colonisers themselves that have assisted the 
tax  haven jurisdictions  in  structuring their  financial  services  sector, 
oftentimes  encouraged  by  international  economie  development 
40 
41 
42 
Georgetown University Press, (1999) at 4. 
Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Banks (8 November 1934, amended 1 
January 2009), Systematische Samm1ung des Bundesrechts [SR] 952.0, Recueil 
systematique du droit fédéral [RS] 952.0 (Switz.) art. 46, online: 
<http://www.kpmg.com/CH/de/Library/Legislative-Texts/Documents/pub  20090101-
BankA.pdf> at 17. 
Ledsham, supra note 26 at 3. 
Ibid. 24 
agencies.43  Second,  the  expansion of globalising financial  capital has 
coupled  with  the  soaring  international  demand  for  specialist  retail 
banking and wholesale  banking,  mostly for  large  multinationals and 
mainland banks.  Finally,  it is  the  private  interests  of local  powerful 
players,  most  often  law  offices,  which  have  permitted tax havens  to 
enact  certain  initiatives.  For  example,  Reg  Jeune,  who  has  become 
President of the States of Jersey's Policy and Resources Committee, was 
a  highly  influential  attorney  who  has  brought  his  practice  to  new 
heights  and  has  become  prominent  member  of the  'Offshore  Magic 
Circle' of law  firms,  notorious  for  their  authority within  their island 
hosts and their sizeable profits from the offshore finance.44 
In his detailed account on the history of tax havens,  Professor 
Ronen Palan of Birmingham University complements the mainstream 
account of the reproduction of the Swiss model in most tax havens by 
focusing  on  other  scenarios  of  tax  haven  development.  45  lt is  his 
contention that the Swiss model and its subsequent development in the 
60's  was a  second phase occurrence in the tax  hav~n culture, as the 
true  origins  of  the  modern  tax  havens  should  be  traced  to  the 
instruments developed in the  19th  century United States, in the states 
of New Jersey and Delaware, pioneers of the easy incorporation rules, 
which  persist  to  this  day.  As  such,  legislatures  of both states were 
influenced by corporate lawyers to  break away from  the Anglo-Saxon 
traditional restrictive stance and to opt for  liberal incorporation laws 
and low corporate tax rates to attract non-resident companies. lt is only 
43 
44 
45 
Ibid at 4. 
Mark Hampton &John Christensen, "Small Island Economies: Exploring Alternative 
Development Strategies to Hosting Offshore Finance" Kent Business School, University 
of  Kent,  Canterbury, Working Paper No. 227 (July 201 0), at 6. 
Ronen Palan, "The history oftax havens" History & Policy (October 2009), online: 
<http :/  /www. historyandpo  licy  .org/papers/policy-paper  -92.html>. ~~~~~--~~~~~~-~--~--------~--~-~---- ------- -~-~~--~~~~~~~~----, 
25 
a  few decades later, in the 1920's that this practice has been copied in 
Europe, first adopted by Swiss canton of Zug.46 Subsequently, the Swiss 
financial  capital  of  Zurich  became  a  hub  for  Switzerland's  societé 
anonyme  and  mailbox  companies,  whereas  Lichtenstein,  next  to 
developing  its  previously  mentioned  expertise  in  trusts,  was  first  to 
introduce holding companies, also enacting legislation exempting them ~ 
from in  come taxes in 1929.47 
1.3.1. Corporate Activities, the early British Route 
Finally,  one cannot overlook one significant historical footnote, 
which  resonates  with  the  forth  OECD  criterion  for  tax  havens, 
mentioned under the rubric of definitions, for it too, traces its origins to 
the second decade of the 2Qth  century, where precedents were created 
for assessing and taxing the nature of a corporation. 
While Delaware and New Jersey made incorporation easy, it was 
the  British  legal  system  that  has  created  the  technique  known  as 
virtual  residencies,  which  have  essentially  allowed  companies  to 
incorporate in Britain without paying tax - the very idea that became 
part of the legal baggage of the entire British Empire, which includes 
the  majority of today's  OFCs.  In a  landmark case  of 1929, Viscount 
Sumner has argued that if taxed, UK incorporated companies that carry 
out business  activities  outside of the  United  Kingdom,  would  simply 
choose to leave,  famously questioning "  ...  whether British status and 
. 46 
47 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 26 
British protection are in business worth the price?"4s  The outcome of 
the case has had significant influence on the entire British realm, and 
has effectively created a  legalloophole, whereby "a company registered 
in London it did not have any activities in the UK  ...  was [hence]  not 
subject to  British taxation."49  It is only in  1988 that United Kingdom 
has legislated to link incorporation within its borders to tax residency, 
even in the absence of the company's substantive activities there.so 
1.3.2. Corporate Residency under the OECD 
Since that time,  it is the head office  that has most commonly 
began to determine corporate nationality (which carries with it adhering 
to local tax laws, thus making incorporation, setting up of trusts on the 
territory  of OFCs  and  flying  the  flags  of convenience,  so  attractive). 
However,  the  2008  OECD  Model  Tax  Convention  on  Income  and  on 
Capital, s1  under its article 4(3) offers a residency test, which, in an effort 
to  regulate  taxation  of  corporations  with  shareholders,  concerns 
companies and corporate bodies, whether or not they constitute a  legal 
person.s2  It should be mentioned that taxation framework of companies 
versus  that the  individual shareholders is  not clearly defined  by the 
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Convention, though  the  analysis of its specifie articles, one  can argue 
that when coupled with provisions normally found in tax treaties, it is 
the active or direct business incarne that is indented to be levied from 
the companies,  as a  company's  ultimate  shareholders are  intended to 
be taxed in the country of their residence.s3 
By  the  same  token,  though  the  situation  is  not  clear  with 
companies in a multinational group, it seems logical to restrict taxation 
on incarne when the company is  taxed at source,  whereby dividends 
paid  by a  source-taxed  company,s4 or any other  capital gains  on its 
shares  should not be  taxed.ss  Moreover,  the meat and bones  of this 
work, transfer pricing rules, were given special attention by the drafters 
of the Convention, whereby  under 7  and 9, the  rules are  intended to 
achieve  allocation  between  states,  both  within  the  company  and 
between its group members.s6 
The OECD itself, in its commentaries on the Convention, points 
out that the residency test strives to  avoid double taxation,  but also 
single out the difficulties with the terminology, which ultimately lead to 
legalloopholes. As such, the commentaries refer to various conventions 
ruling  the  interstate  relationships  that  focus  on  the  "place  of 
management"  of the enterprise, while others attach importance to its 
"place  of  effective  management"  or  to  the  "fiscal  domicile  of  the 
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operator"  .s1  Canada,  for' example,  m  the  best Anglo-Saxon  tradition, 
looks  at  the  place  of incorporation  and,  failing  that,  "to  deny  dual 
resident  companies  the  benefits  under the  Convention,"  while  most 
countries have opted for the  "place of effective management" criterion, 
whereby'  "key  management  and  commercial  decisions  that  are 
necessary  for  the  conduct  of the  entity's  business  are  in substance 
made."ss  This scenario illustrates well how conflicts of law are possible, 
when, for example, a  company's place of incorporation is different from 
the place where its board of directors meets and makes decisions, and 
the two states purport to tax the company, claiming its resident status 
for tax purposes within their borders. 
At the same time,  one has to  be mindful of the complexity of 
corporate  taxation  mechanisms,  given  the  sheer number of taxation 
treaties available to companies.  OECD itself admits to the problem of 
treaty shopping, whereby companies manage to reduce source tax rates 
through  the  use  of interposed  entities  under  a  favourable  treaty.59 
Moreover,  as  an  example  of  the  multitude  of  interpretations  in 
international  tax  matters  that  handsomely  provide  for  tax  arbitrage 
opportunities, the very definition of what gets taxed, the capital gains 
and losses, are also subject to controversy. As such, commonly, a  gain 
or a  loss of an asset is determined upon its disposai or realization, in 
what is known as a  realization model, which is easier to administer, yet 
less equitable than its counterpart, the accrual model, which looks at 
the increase  (or the decrease)  in the value of the asset,  regardless of 
whether or not the asset has been liquidated. The term realization is not 
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uniform, and it may mean anything from sale to forfeiture, from receipt 
of insurance money to transfer from business to a private property.6o 
There is no uniformity of application of the two models between 
the states, and in the case of the realization model,  there is a lot of fine 
tuning,  as a  realized asset should also pass the so-called recognition 
test,  which  is  statutorily  recognized  by most  tax  codes;  as  such,  a 
realized asset can become subject to  a  juridical exemption, which is 
rather ajuridical deferral.61 In Canada, for example, "transfers of capital 
assets  to  a  corporation in return for  shares  of the  corporation"  are 
subject to the nonrecognition exception. In the US, there are even more 
possibilities  for  the  corporate  foreign  incarne  deferrai,  whereby  that 
foreign  incarne  is  "repatriated"  to  the ·US  through the  payment  of a 
dividend to the American MNC  by its  foreign subsidiary. The logistics 
behind this is such that delayed dividend payment through retaining 
earnings abroad confers "a substantial deferrai advantage on the MNC 
by significantly reducing the present value of its US tax liability." By the 
same token, the deferrai advantage can be even greater  in the case of 
the subsidiary on the OFC territory, as "the immediate source-based tax 
paid to the tax haven government is low or zero  ..  "62 
Once these terms of what gets taxed are defined, further inter-
jurisdictional discrepancy  cornes into play whereby how to tax becomes 
the question. Like with all the previous terms, there is no uniformity of 
application between  states  and taxation  of capital gains  as  ordinary 
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incarne versus the taxation of capital gains as separate incarne becomes 
. the weapon of choice by the individual states.63 Thus, the bottom line is 
the vast potential for  incredible maneuverability of corporations,  who 
are in position to arrange their finances in a way that would save them 
tax money or allow to somehow avoid paying taxes altogether. 
1.4  Tax Havens: Fundamental questions 
From  a  taxpayer's  viewpoint,  it  is  precisely  the  debatable 
inadequacy  of  domestic  taxation  that  serves  many  scholars  as  a 
justification  for  legitimizing  the  use  of  the  OFCs,  despite  the 
understandable discontent of onshore jurisdictions, whose tax base is 
eroded by the use of the OFCs by their nationals or former nationals. 
The  main  concern  of the  state  players,  on  the  other hand,  revolves 
around  the  belief that  the  OFCs  "distort  the  financial  system  on  a 
threatening  scale  by  undermining  the  ability  of  high  tax  onshore 
nations to raise revenues through taxation."M In one report submitted 
by IMF, it has been demonstrated that for every  1%  point increase in 
the top corporate  tax rates of developed countries, which are for  the 
most part, OECD member states, capital inflows to OFCs rose by 5% in 
general and influx into by Caribbean countries, by 19%.6s And though it 
is true that tax fraud, tax evasion and financing illicit activities merit 
63 
64 
65 
Ibid at 95. 
George Mendes, "Offshore Financial Centres in the Global Economy" The Strategy 
Tank, online: 
<http://strategytank.awardspace.com/articles/The%20Future%20o:f0/o200ffshore%20Fi 
nancial%20Centres%20in%20the%20Global%20Economy.pdf> at 6. 
International Monetary Fund, IMF Country report No 01/3, Table 5: Fund staff 
estimates. 31 
active condemning legislative intervention amongst the governments of 
developed  countries,  legitimate  attempts  by  corporations  and 
individuals alike to reduce their taxes, still geta bad rap. 
Such  a  stance  is  very understandable,  as  in  the  eyes  of any 
government, lost revenue is a primordial sin, while when it cornes to the 
concept of social justice or social equality towards  the  population at 
large,  it  seems  that  sophisticated  and  costly  tax  planning  is  only 
available to the privileged few,  and by succeeding in profiteering from 
the offshore arrangements, these rich are made even richer, resonating 
with public outcry amid the weakening economy and a  series of global 
financial scandais. Despite this view, sorne authors advocate for making 
good  use  of available  resources,  painting  out  that  "[reducing]  one's 
taxation burden is acceptable and widely recommended,"  stemming out 
of the principle of individual freedom, [and] has serious global economie 
benefits.66  These include job creation in the offshore jurisdictions and 
promoting  economie  liberalization  by  forcing  high  tax-bracket 
jurisdictions  into  tax competition  among  nations.67  Moreover,  it  has 
been  argued  that  despite  hosting  a  disproportionate  fraction  of the 
world's  foreign  direct investment,  the  may  well  be  enabling high-tax 
OECD  countries to "impose lower effective tax rates on highly mobile 
firms, while taxing immobile firms more heavily."6s 
A corollary view is expressed by most supporters  of the  OECD 
policies and sorne even venture as far as  to say that tax havens are not 
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"natural entities with natural rights or the legitimacy of tradition" and 
should there not be able to daim that they "naturally" use the rules of 
the free market as well as their political power of sovereignty.69  By the 
same token, being in the business where their main product, based on 
the international legal principle of territoriality, is their ability to write 
laws,  tax  havens  are  often  blamed  for  their  so  called  "parking  lot 
mentality",  whereby akin to car lot owner who  does not care  for  the 
identity of those taking up the spots,  as long as they pay,  the OFCs 
disregard  the  true  nature  of  the  companies  residing  within  their 
borders.1o  More  importantly  though,  what  most  authors  find 
troublesome  is  the  shroud  of  secrecy,  exemplified  by  the  recent 
financial scandais discussed earlier in this work, which have involved 
whistle blowing on sorne major banks. Secrecy is so vilified simply due 
to the global income reporting requirement, native to almost all states, 
with their "residence-based taxes on the interest, dividends and cap~tal 
gains  earned  by their residents  abroad."11  Thus,  it is  clear that the 
OFCs with  their bank secrecy laws  allow  the  wealthy  to  cheat their 
respective governments out of the possibility of taxing them, as it does 
with all their fellow  citizens, who simply cannot or wish not to afford 
such a break. 
The aforementioned commercialization of state sovereignty, has 
reached such proportions because of a  paradoxical interplay between 
the  globalization  or rather,  growing  integration  of the  world  market, 
with its advanced communication and transportation technologies and 
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accelerated capital mobility, and the "increasing insulation of the state 
in law," with the strengthened unity of the state.12  With this in mind, 
one  should  ask  whether  the  international  community  justified  in 
wishing to  implement mechanisms  of control in order to  reverse  the 
ongoing offshore trend, to restore arguable fairness? Does the classical 
OFC  mentality  necessarily  invalidate  stately  attributes  and  calls  for 
sorne  sort  of  a  second-tier  category  for  states?  As  it  stands  now, 
perhaps it is possible morally, but not legally, as state sovereignty is an 
absolute and final attribute of any political community, (though such a 
move in itself would imply a  drawback to the colonial times, which is 
not exactly a  morally justifiable stance, given the history of most of the 
OFCs). Thus, shaming techniques are often used to influence OFC and 
to force  them and other state actors to adopt measures to change the 
legal  status  quoi,  forcing  more  transparency into  their dealings with 
foreign investors. ln fact, transparency has becomethe modus operandi 
of the  OECD  politics  towards  the  OFCs  in  the  recent years,  but as 
always, implementation of these policies seems to be the weakest link, 
as it will be more amply demonstrated in this work, however, it would 
be worthwhile to mention the work of authors Picard and Pieretti.73 
As  such,  in addressing  banking secrecy in  the  context of the 
OFCs discuss the dilemma faced  by the OFCs, who are pressured by 
international  organizations  like  the  OECD  to  sacrifice  the  adequate 
customer  due-diligence  in  favour  of  "scrupulous  monitoring  of  an 
investors  identity  and  the  origins  of  [their]  funds."7 4  The  authors 
discuss the effectiveness of pressure tactics and use their impact on the 
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OFC  economies,  specifically focusing on compliance  incentives.  Even 
though multinational enterprises (hereinafter MNEs)  rival economies of 
states, they are private actors, and unlike states, they cannot be subject 
to sanctions, having no status under international law. Thus, based on 
their empirical  findings,  authors  argue  that the  best way  to  ensure 
compliance with anti-money laundering standards lay precisely with the 
properly  motivated  behaviour  of financial  intermediaries,  the  banks. 
The authors find  that banks generally loose  because of the pressure 
tactics by the onshore jurisdictions and international organizations and 
that fighting illicit gains is only possible in the context of competition 
among OFCs and only when the banks' opportunity cost for losing the 
criminal proceeds is low.1s  By the same token, the findings of the study 
show that onshore institutions adopt efficient pressure strategies only 
"if the social cost of criminality is high enough" and only when "ordinary 
investors incur a  reputational harm that in monetary equivalent terms 
is  larger  than  the  banks' cost  of monitoring  investors."  Finally,  the 
study finds that non-compliance is greater with the increased number 
of illegal investors and with a  greater degree of international financial 
integration.  76  This last fin ding is particularly applicable to  the case of 
HSBC, discussed in the third part of this work, the bank which found 
itself at the epicenter of financial scandai for opening offshore accounts 
purportedly used for money laundering and British tax evasion. 
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Tax havens attract different types of financial activity, including 
private banking, captive insurance companies, various types of trusts, 
and the classic international business companies, which may or may 
not generate any substantial activity on the territory of the tax haven;11 
due  to  discrepancy of legislative  exigencies  in regards  to information 
disclosure,  incorporation  standards,  citizenship  requirements  and 
privacy issues between tax havens and other countries, the OFCs can 
potentially serve as a base of illicit activities and have thus incurred bad 
reputation among the general public. 
Several countries, whether openly recognized as tax havens, or 
having sorne tax haven characteristics by simply offering a  beneficiai 
tax  for  foreign  nationals,  carry  a  stigma  of harbouring  proceeds  of 
criminal activities and of contributing to international monetary fraud 
and tax evasion. This impression is propagated around the world due to 
the  lack  of  transparency  and  in  the  absence  of  disclosure  of any 
information regarding the investments. Recognized tax haven countries, 
most  of  which  are  island  nations,  not  generating  any  substantial 
economie activity of their own,  attract shrewd investors and financial 
criminals  alike,  offering favourable  legislative stance towards banking 
secrecy laws,  investment incentives,  financial  and legal  tools  and an 
overall favourable tax elima  te. According to the IMF statistics for 1999, 
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OFCs' cross-border assets were over four and a half trillion US dollars,78 
and these numbers have substantially gone up in the past decade. By 
sorne other accounts, the  OFCs amass more than half of the world's 
stock of money,  with nearly  "20  percent of total  private wealth  and 
about 22  percent of banks' external  assets  [being  invested]  invested 
offshore." 79 
This increase is attributable to the move towards deregulation, 
caused by the progressive liberalization of financial markets, as well as 
to  the  very  nature  of  economie  globalization,  which  sorne  authors 
construe as both a quantitative and a qualitative change in the financial 
world,  referring  respectively  to  the  increase  of  the  volume  of 
transactions  and  the  calibre  and  variety  of financial  instruments.so 
That being said,  it would be worthy  to  mention that aforementioned 
deregulation or a regulatory shift, is also consistent V{ith the emergence 
of  such  professional  bodies  as  the  BaseZ  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision  (hereinafter  BCBS),  the  International  Association  of 
Insurance  Supervisors  (hereinafter  lAIS)  and  the  International 
Organization of Securities Commission (hereinafter IOSCO), as well as of 
both  interstate  and  state-sanctioned  self-regulatory  organizational 
agreements,s1  which strive to harmonize the discrepancies in the value 
systems between that in turn prove to be an obstacle in interpreting 
business norms and compliance standards. 
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Money laundering (including proceeds of and capitals used for 
illicit activities, such as financial fraud, drug trafficking and terrorism), 
is the centerpiece of the OECD discourse. Considered by sorne to be one 
of the most flagrant problems generated by the OFCs, it is often cited as 
the  reason  for  their  eradication.  With  banking  secrecy  and 
confidentiality  being  the  key  attractions  of  tax  haven  countries, 
permitting them  to  successfully  compete  for  foreign  investment with 
such economically powerful nations  as United States and Canada,  it 
becomes virtually impossible and highly speculative to  determine the 
percentage  of such murky transactions  taking place.s2  In  the  recent 
years,  several  legislative  initiates  purporting  to  pierce  the  traditional 
secrecy  associated  with  banking  and  certain  corporate  actions  have 
been launched,s3  but it remains  to  be seen what tangible  effect  they 
have on the tax haven jurisdictions. As the number of these initiatives 
grows, be iton the nationallevel, or proposed by non-state bodies such 
as the UN  or OECD,s4  the pressure for major accountability reform in 
the offshore corporate and banking spheres grow. 
The corollary of this, of course, is the historical realities of state 
behaviour in times  of economie hardships;  the vision of an "offshore 
republic" emerged in the 1970's, when the burdens imposed on capital 
by the  industrialized  nations  had  never  been  higher,  with  tax rates 
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soaring  throughout  the  member  states  of  the  OECD.  National 
restrictions and regulations on the movement and exchange of money 
kept  capital  locked  into  individual  states,  hobbled  by  fiscal  and -
monetary  instability,  rocketing  inflation,  and  political  crises,  and 
ultimately  furthering  the  premise  of  Capitalism's  dream  of  total 
detachment from the social world.ss That being said, it is precisely that 
social element, which becomes a  point of contention in all discussions 
surrounding  tax  havens,  bringing  out  same  arguments  and 
considerations  as  those  prevalent  in  debates  on  social  corporate 
responsibility, which in turn has been heralded as part of the solution 
for the OFC shortcomings. 
1.4.2  Changing tides 
From the consumer's  view point, the OFCs provide a  valid and 
legal  avenue  for  the  protection  of  their  assets,  but  even  more 
importantly, for easing up the tax burden, though it should be added 
that this  proverbial consumer usually belongs  to  the  top  tier of any 
state's economie foundation,  to  the  privileged few  who both have the 
resources  to  protect  and  the  means  to  do  so,  through  skilful  tax 
planning  strategies.  It  is  these  investors,  who  are  responsible  for 
massive  exodus  of funds  from  their  respective  domestic  economies, 
prompting  the  latter  to  come  up  with  both  punitive  measures  and 
various legislative initiatives aimed to attract part of the money flow into 
the state coffers. One example of changing tides would be the situation 
with the foreign earnings  deduction provisions in Great Britain  in the 
1990's.  Initially, a U.K.  national, absent from home for over a year and 
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who in a year spends less than 62 days there was exempt from incarne 
tax on foreign source incarne. What the Blair govemment then did to 
those expats wishing to return to England's shores was subjecting them 
to the incarne taxon their world-wide incarne in the event that they had 
any U.K. source incarne at all.s6  This trend continues, as more recently, 
Her  Majesty's  Revenue  and  Customs  guidelines,s7  which  explain  the 
realities of British taxation, portray a very limited set of circumstances, 
whereby  individuals  and  corporate  entities  would  benefit  from  tax 
deductions  should  their  incarne  primarily  originate  abroad.  For 
example, Capital Gains Tax may be charged retroactively on disposais 
made  by  someone  who  was  not  a  UK  resident  and  not  ordinarily 
resident for a  "temporary" period of time,ss  thus severely undermining 
the  utility of the  multitude  of the  Double Taxation Agreements  that 
England has ratified, which includes most of the recognized tax haven 
jurisdictions.s9  By the same token, British tax guides have pointed out 
a significant change affecting the taxation of the foreign-source incarne, 
noting that in 2009,  a  unified regime regulating the remittance rules 
replaced various complex provisions, all in an attempt to 
"to reduce the scope for  avoiding tax by  remitting incarne or gains in 
years after the. source had ceased or in a form other than cash or by an 
indirect route that was not hitherto taxable, including the use of third 
parties, companies or trusts."9o 
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This new regime also allows for addressing previously unremitted 
foreign incarne and gains, as well as sorne of the mixed funds, which 
contain various capital gains or incarne  categories.91  Thus,  it seems 
that  the  trick  be  cornes  not  only  to  legally  save  the  mo  ney,  at that 
without  forcefully  severing  the  ties  with  the  home  state,  by  going 
offshore,  but  to  actually  keep  the  saving  and  to  continue  savmg, 
preferably without having to  declare your world-wide  incarne  to your 
main taxman and while keeping your affairs private. And to do so, tax 
havens are one's weapon of choice. 
More  recently,  amid  financial  scandais  and  the  so-called 
foreclosure crisis in the United States, European Union economie woes, 
particularly  marked  by  Greece's  financial  catastrophe  and 
demonstrations against capitalism across the board, the idea of taxing 
the  rich  and  righteous  anger  against  the  tax  dodgers  became  the 
common  subject  at  global  economie  forums  and  at  dinner  tables 
worldwide. The same gloom picture that organizations like OECD have 
been painting for a while became the standard. 
From the regulatory standpoint, diversity of OFCs, the possibility 
of profiteering from their advantageous legal and fiscal  framework for 
pursuing  illicit  activities,  coupled  with  sovereignty  issues  and  free 
market ideals,  present  a  true  challenge  for  the  homogenization  and 
global  adoption  of  any  legislative  initiative,  as  it  is  more  amply 
demonstrated throughout this work.  As  such, in the recent years, tax 
havens have been subject to scrutiny by such global watchdogs as the 
91  Ibid. 41 
OECD, Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter FATF),92 IOSCO and the 
IMF,  prompting much public debate on the idea of lifting the secrecy in 
offshore banking, regulating capital flows and increasing transparency 
in business practices of those engaging in offshore  investments,  and 
raising questions of global information exchange and of fair inter-state 
competition,  all  compromised  by  displaced  resources  and  'invisible 
earnings.' 
In fact, the OECD has issued several important reports over the 
years,  dealing  with  the  problematic  aspects  of  offshore  activities,93 
which study harmful tax  pract~ces. The reports discuss the effects  of 
such  practices  and  name  such  consequences  as  the  overall 
discouragement of taxpayer compliance,  shifting tax burden on such 
less mobile tax bases as labour, property and consumption and adverse 
effects on national public spending, and propose a series of initiatives to 
be  undertaken  by  individual  states  (most  notably,  the  so  called  tax 
havens) in order to tackle the forth mentioned problems created by tax 
abuse.9 4  By the same token, the United States State department in the 
recent  years  has  issued  a  rather  comprehensive  report  directly 
addressing the idea of the harmful uses of tax havens,9s following the 
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stead of broader initiatives, such as the recommendations of the FATF.96 
That being said, it is interesting to trace the evolution of the mandate of 
the FATF throughout the change of U.S. presidential administrations. 
Throughout the 1990's OECD has made its mission to eliminate, 
what it deemed to  be "harmful tax competition,"  a  position that was 
fully supported by the Clinton administration, as the US has taken a 
leadership role in shaping policies  on the question of OFCs, and has 
encouraged its fellow OECD members to take all the necessary steps to 
eradicate the distortions they caused undermining the benefits of global 
capital  mobility.97  The  OECD's  report,  Harmful  Tax  Competition:  an 
Emerging Global Issue, cited earlier in this work, has been a  result of 
these efforts and to this day, it serves as a  defining framework for tax 
haven activities. 
In  stark  contrast,  the  Bush  administration  has  practically 
reversed  the  American  stance  on  tax  haven  activities,  issuing  a 
statement  through  the  US  Trade  Department  to  the  effect  that  the 
OECD  1998  report,  as  well  as  its  2001  complimentary  report, 
essentially demonize countries that offer a  more favourable tax climate. 
Because of the Bush administration's efforts, the OECD was forced to 
shift  the  direction  of  its  policies  to  improving  exchanges  of  tax 
information between member countries.9s 
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Once the democrats have moved back into the White house in 
2008, the US politics towards the OFCs has taken another 180 degrees 
turn,  openly  making  fighting  tax  havens  one  of  the  top  financial 
priorities,  which  was  exemplified  by  the  rhetoric  of  the  US 
representatives in the context of the G-8 and G-20 summits. In fact, the 
US has even gone as far as moving from words to  (legislative)  action, 
introducing the "Stop tax havens" bill before Congress and referring it to 
a  Congressional  Committee  in July  of 2012.  The  nature  of the  bill 
resides  with  the idea that the  person having financial  dealings  with 
entitîes essentially _ located in "questionable" jurisdictions is deemed to 
be the beneficiary of the funds  transferred and to have an automatic 
requirement of reporting to the Internai Revenue Service. Furthermore, 
the  taxpayer  would  have  to  prove  that  the  transactions  have  an 
economie value and do not merely constitute actions aimed at avoiding 
taxes.99 As harsh and far reaching as this bill is, no follow up has been 
given in nearly a  year and a  half,  and according to  Govtrack,  a  self-
proclaimed  normalized  database  of legislative  information,  the  bill  is 
likely  to  die  on the  operating  table  of the  Congressional  Committee, 
having a meager 6% chance of being enacted.1oo That being said, it is yet 
to be seen what Barack Obama's  second term will bring to the table in 
this  matter,  with  the  ad  campaigns  during  the  presidential  race 
vociferously attacking his opponent's financial holding in the Cayman 
Islands on the one hand, and with the plethora of domestic problems 
his administration must address based on his campaign promises on 
the other. It is the contention of this work that the "sleeping dogs" will 
continue to be allowed to lay under this presidential term as well, with 
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too many American MNEs having vested interest in the status quoi and 
based on the track record of dealings with these corporations, which 
will be addressed in the final section of this work. 
1.4.3. Impact of the global struggle on small OFC 
states 
The  financially  attractive  policy  decisions  that  attract  the 
offshore investors made by small states, oftentimes referred to as Small 
Island  States  or  Small  Island  Economies  (hereinafter  SIEs),  have 
prompted acknowledgement from such global giants as the World Bank, 
which,  for  example,  recognizes  their  influence  in  financial  and 
telecommunication  spheres  to  the  point  of organizing  annual  global 
forums. 101  At the same time, the economie sovereign freedom enjoyed by 
the OFCs breeds opposition from their onshore counterparts, resulting 
in  a  plethora  of cases  in  front  of global  administrative  boards  and 
tribunals, for example in the area of internet gambling;w2  this effectively 
illustrates the point of how the OFCs do not bear all negative effects and 
externalities  (loss  of  taxable  income,  financial  support  of  terrorist 
activities,  etc),  which  are  shifted  to  other  nations.  That  being,  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  despite  this  tendency  and  despite  its  own 
reports and policies seeking to curb harmful effects of tax completion,  1o3 
the European Parliament has recently chosen to block the agreement on 
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banking data transfers with the United States,1o4  thus adhering to the 
previously mentioned deregulation trend.1os 
However,  coming  back  to  the  realities  of SIEs,  whieh  provide 
large transnational corporations and wealthy investors with the ability 
to profiteer from such contraptions as asset-holding trusts and offshore 
companies, specialist offshore corporate vehicles such as International 
Business  Corporations  (hereinafter  IBCs),  captive  insurance  and 
offshore funds, it should be mentioned that many of them have gone to 
develop  impressive  expertise  and  offer  such  specialized  financial 
services  as  Bermuda's  captive  insurance,  Guernsey's  protected  cell 
companies  and Jersey's  trust management and  securitization.1o6  The 
sophistication of these services creatively blooms out of the lack of other 
economie advantages, explained by  geographie factors, such as limited 
natural resources,  high transport costs due to  the distance from  the 
major  onshore  economies  and  dependency  on  the  onshore  produce, 
whieh  makes  them  "price-takers",  rather than  price-makers;  by  the 
same token,  on the economie side of things,  SNEs have small labour 
markets,  deficiencies in professional and institutional knowledge  and 
experience,  and the  dysfunctional  market structures  left  to  them  by 
their colonial past,  as well  as restrieted  comparative advantages and 
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diseconomies of scale.1o7 Moreover, it has been argued by sorne that due 
to  their sheer stature,  small open economies  are  destined to  remain 
"price-takers" of the global markets, thus being unable to shift any of 
their tax burdens  onto  foreign  investors  at risk  of "[distorting]  their 
economies without extracting resources from foreigners."1os  By the same 
token, circumventing the traditional developmental path taken by most 
OECD members, the SNEs become victims of the clutches of, what the 
American  best-selling author Thomas  L.  Friedman  calls,  the  Golden 
Straightjacket,  which alongside  with prosperity levels  rising,  limits  a 
state's  political  and  economie  choices.  109  The  Golden  Straightjacket 
doctrine  demands  that the  state puts an emphasis  on  foreign  direct 
investment  (hereinafter  FDI)  and  its  own  private  sector,  inter  alia 
privatizing  state-owned  industries  and  utilities,  deregulating  capital 
markets  and  its  own  economy  and  opening;  and  although  the 
homogeneity  of  Friedman's  argument  has  been  challenged,  11 0  one 
cannat dispute the  repercussions  for  SNE's  of opening themselves  to 
FDI to the extent that they have in the attempt to fight the effects of the 
fallout  of trade  liberalization  on  their  domestic  markets,  previously 
centered on largely uncompetitive manufacturing sectors. 
Ironically,  by catering to  the rich,  the  SNEs  have  developed  a 
similar dependency relationship they have known in their colonial days, 
as their interests have been "subsumed to the needs of global capital", 
in a  similar way that Least Developed Countries have faced issues of 
loss of control and of dependency on a specifie sector, being themselves 
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infused and run by transnational capital.m In doing so, SNEs have lost 
revenues from the exports of their manufacturing goods over the years, 
and have in turn beeome even more dependent on their financial and 
tourism sectors (which go  hand in hand to accommodate the influx of 
investors);  and  with  their  traditional  industries  eradicated,  the  new 
businesses that open in nonfinancial service spheres are "erowded-out 
by high costs and by the laek of skilled labour and knowledge".  112  As 
such, it is interesting to see the recycling of traditional industries into 
the financial services sector, as it happened for example on the islands 
of St-Kitts  and  Nevis,  where  until  recently,  investors were  offered  to 
make a  contribution of a  few hundred thousand dollars, depending on 
the number of dependents, into the fund of the no longer functioning 
sugar industry in an exchange for citizenship, which to sorne is a  small 
priee to pay for  an essentially dean slate and ability to travel without 
the same formalities as under their existing citizenship.1!3 
The example of St-Kitts and Nevis is by no means unique and the 
priee levels it sets for its citizenship is an illustration to the marginal 
utility  for  this  type  of  "service",  as  with  the  multitude  of  options 
available, it is the standard rules of the Keynesian economies that start 
to apply and regulate priees. More importantly though, the example is 
also  indicative  of  the  utilitarian  approach  of  tax  havens  to  sueh 
sacrosanct notion as citizenship, which in a way echoes the angle taken 
by the OECD publications; as such, the OECD strives to expose SNEs 
as  sorne  sort  of subpar  states,  failing  to  meet  financial  regulatory 
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standards  of  their  onshore  counterparts,  poaching  the  latter's  tax: 
revenues  and existing solely to  cater to  "the interests  and needs  of 
money launderers, tax:  avoiders  and drug traffickers."ll4  And although 
the  OECD  contention has always been the deniai of any attempts to 
take away fiscal sovereignty of individual states, it has been argued that 
the  organization  essentially  tries  to rid  the  SNEs  of their  sovereign 
independence by effectively insisting that these countries function as 
the tax: agent for other sovereign states. 
Such a  dichotomy is caused by sorne sort of collective cognitive 
dissonance115  that  exists  between  the  neo-classical  concept  of 
sovereignty and the state's inability to enforce their own tax: laws upon 
its own residents due to a  "lack of information concerning any foreign 
assets or investments they may own."11 6 This is problematic not only 
because these  externally driven attempts  clearly contradict the basic 
principle of non-intervention, but also because of the methods used by 
the  OECD,  which  operates  under  the  premise  that  their  proposed 
policies  aimed  countering  "harmful  tax:  competition,"  somehow 
embodies common goal of all states and which chooses  the so called 
naming  and  shaming  techniques  and  unilaterally  "suggests"  the 
implementation changes to SNEs that are in direct conflict with their 
existing laws.II7 
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Moreover, one must not forget the additional difficulty of SNEs to 
adapt  themselves  to  the  digitized  global  economy,  which  no  longer 
allows for sustainability of competition based on the old,  neoclassical 
notions of comparative advantage and which makes dominance of any 
market sphere virtually impossible  even  for  larger states,  as  specifie 
targeted strategies are required, involving collaboration from companies. 
As  such,  the  OFCs,  with  their  small,  vulnerable  economies,  limited 
resources, undiversified economies and.heavy reliance on imports, are 
extremely vulnerable  to  domestic  and external  shocks,  making their 
ability  to  respond  to  this  changing  economie  system  severely 
inhibited.11s  In arder to fight back and offset the pressures of the OECD 
club members,  SNEs have to work collectively,  and the most famous 
and  productive  coalition  is  the  CARICOM,  the  community  of  the 
Caribbean  states,  which  in  the  face  of  trade  liberalization  has 
successfully  evaluated  its  choices  for  overcoming  its  developmental 
issues and for achieving economie prosperity, and which has opted for 
forming a single market to maintain a sustainable competitiveness.JJ9 
However, coming back to the SNE behaviour, another important 
consequence of the SNE's adherence to the strict financial services diet 
is the creation of powerfullobbies in the guise of financial institutions 
that affect local regulatory policies and use their influence to make sure 
that policies giving them favourable tax and regulatory advantages get 
enacted.  In turn,  this  breeds  a  political stance  within the  state that 
would  disadvantage  its  local  population  in  an  attempt  to  remain 
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competitive in the event that the state is targeted and pressured by the 
global community, forcing the number of OFC firms  on its territory to 
decrease;  as  such,  indirect  taxation  on  local  residents  will  likely  be 
increased through 
"[lowered]  direct taxes  on  banking profit,  rising  local  expenditure  on 
social security, sharply falling real estate priees and downstream·effects 
with reduced spending effects within the economy."12o 
Needless  to  say,  in  the  long  run,  this  would  undermine  the 
political and economie stability within the state, which are one of the 
key de facto factors for a  prospering offshore zone: after all, who would 
want to keep their money in an unstable climate? 
Thus, the status quo stability within the SNEs is advantageous 
to the majority of the actors involved,  from the local populations and 
governments, to their powerful clients, to, arguably, the very same state 
actors who conduct to campaigns against them, as it is one thing to go 
after  occasional  group  of  tax  payers  or  challenge  one  financial 
institution's operations (as, for example, it was with crackdown of UBS 
or HSBC's operations, mentioned in the third part of this work), and it 
is quite another to eut off the oxygen to major financial institutions and 
transnational  firms,  which  have  powerful  lobbies  in  their  original 
jurisdictions and which serve to create jobs there, altogether. lt is the 
contention of this work that this  is  one  of the  reasons why the tax 
havens should endure.  In the next part, it will  be examined in great 
detail  how  exactly  these  multinational  firms  get  past  the  stigma, 
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regulations  and  legal  pursuits  in  connection  with  their  offshore 
activities.  And  until  service  and  product  diversification  become  the 
reality in the  now offshore jurisdictions,  chances are,  not much will 
change. CHAPTER II 
THE INNER OPERATIONS OF AN  OFC: TRANSFER PRICING 
-
2.1  General reflections 
The offshore financial network offers multinational-entities and 
small  companies  alike  sophisticated  financial  instruments  through 
essentially  repackaging  the  money  they  have  earned  in  the  capital 
markets  in the  form . of bonds,  options,  derivatives,  such as  forward 
agreements and futures, et cetera.121  A good example of this, would be a 
· structured finance  deal,  whereby the transaction,  such as  s<=;lling  an 
onshore  company's  receivables  to  an  offshore  company  would  be 
followed by issuance and sale of the latter's bonds to investors,  122  is not 
subject  to  either  tax  tariffs  or  regulatory  limitations  it  would  face 
onshore. Financial relations between the onshore and offshore affiliates 
could  serve  as  another  example.  As  such,  business  operations  in 
onshore  or higher tax jurisdictions  could be financed  by loans  from 
their  offshore  partners,  thus  reducing  the  income  earned  at  home 
through interest payments,  and ultimately increasing holdings in the 
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offshore coffers. This method is particularly attractive to multinational 
firms,  who  can,  with a  lot of legal  finesse,  use it to repatriate  debt, 
dividends and royalty payments between its affiliates in high and low-
tax jurisdictions. Similarly, an OFC company placed on the top of the 
ownership  command  can  dispatch  earning  between  jurisdictions, 
thereby  avoiding  receiving  and  paying  taxes  on  profits  in  high-tax 
jurisdictions.J23  Thus becoming an OFC  (or even an export processing 
zone, which combines the benefits of a  free trade zone with traditional 
benefits of~  OFC), allows a  small state to exploit the neutral nature of 
capital,  whereby  "money  is  "booked"  ... ,  having  merely  a  virtual 
presence,  similar  to  the  tourists  who  pass  through  the  island  like 
daylight ghosts."l24 Traditional onshore financial centers do not have the 
same latitude of financial terms and cannot offer a competitive response 
to the OFCs for the need to deregulate their own financial systems.12s 
2.2.  Transfer Pricing 
One other shining example of a  sophisticated corporate financial 
instrument is  transfer  pricing.  Arguably,  transfer  pricing constitutes 
one of the pillars of tax havens' creation, as it has allowed companies to 
raise  revenues,  ultimately  profiteering  from  the  absence  of  unified 
worldwide standards. Rapid growth of multinational companies in last 
two decades in the context of the increasingly globalized economy has 
sparked a debate among authorities asto how these companies have to 
be taxed, and in return, tax optimization has become a  dominant issue 
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in company's cost structure, and it has been pointed out time and time 
again  that  transfer  pricing  and  other  offshore  financial  instruments 
adversely affect the ability of many countries to raise tax revenues.J26 It 
would  be worthwhile  to  analyze  this  aspect of international trade  in 
greater  detail,  thus  shedding  light  on  the  practical  application  of 
offshore financial structures in the global economy. 
One  of the  most challenging issues that presents  itself to  the 
companies  and  the  tax  authorities  alike,  is  the  establishment  of 
appropriate transfer priees for  tax purposes.  Simply put,  the transfer 
pricing  refers  to  the  pricing  of goods  and  services  within  a  multi-
divisional  organization,  particularly  in  regard  to  cross-border 
transactions.12?  The  concept  of  transfer  pricing  essentially  refers  to 
those  priees  at  which  an  enterprise  transfers  physical  goods  and 
intangible property or provides services to its associated enterprises.12s 
The criteria of association between two or more enterprises states that if 
one  of  them  participates  directly  or  indirectly  in  the  management, 
control,  or  capital  of the  other  or  if "the  same  persons  participate 
directly or indirectly in the  management,  control,  or  capital"  of both 
enterprises,  these  companies  are  considered  associated.J29  Transfer 
priees  are  significant  for  both  taxpayers  and  tax  administrations 
because  they determine in large  part the  income  and expenses,  and 
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therefore  taxable  profits,  of  associated  enterprises  in  different  tax 
jurisdictions  .13o 
2.2.1  Arm's length principle 
The  crucial  aspect  of  transfer  pricing  is  the  arm's  length 
principle,  which  1s  used  for  fiscal  purposes  in  dealing  with 
multinational  companies  and  associations  of  enterprises.  The 
international standard that the OECD member countries have agreed 
upon to be used for determining transfer priees for tax purposes is set 
forth in Article 9  of the OECD Madel Tax Convention, which reads as 
follows: 
"where conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in 
their commercial or financial  relations which differ  from those which 
would  be  made  between  independent  enterprises,  then  any  profits 
which  would,  but  for  those  conditions,  have  accrued  to  one  of the 
enterprises,  but, by reason of those  conditions,  have not so accrued, 
may  be  included  in  the  profits  of  that  enterprise  and  taxed 
accordingly."J31 
When  independent  companies  transact,  priees  for  their  goods 
and services are generally determined by market forces. And while it is 
true that all companies  try to  obtain best possible  priees  given their 
negotiations  skills  and  market  size,  associated  enterprises  find 
themselves  in  a  particularly  advantageous  position.  When  these 
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transact with each other,  their commercial relations  are  not directly 
affected by extemal market forces in the same way, thus making it both 
possible and particularly tempting to manipulate profits in the interest 
of  the  company.  Knowing  this,  most  developed  countries  have 
established specifie rules to be used for setting and monitoring transfer 
priees,  their  objective  being  to  approximate  priees  that  would  be 
charged by companies in arm's length transactions with an unrelated 
party.  Many  states  have  adopted  for  what's  called  the  arm's  length 
principle in reaching that objective. There are several reasons why this 
method has been favoured over similar available mechanisms, such as 
the global formulary apportionment, but chiefly it is due to the fact that 
the arm's length  principle  provides  broad parity of tax treatment for 
members  of  multinational  companies  and  independent  enterprises. 
More  specifically,  the  arm's  length  principle  puts  associated  and 
independent enterprises on a  more equal footing for tax purposes, thus 
avoiding  the creation of tax advantages  or disadvantages  that would 
otherwise  distort  the  relative  competitive  positions  of either  type  of 
entity.I32  As  such,  this  method  promotes  the  growth of international 
trade and investment and its other advantage lies with the flexibility of 
its application, as it is effective in the majority of circumstances.  For 
instance, there is a plethora of cases involving the purchase and sale of 
commodities and the lending of money whereby an arm's  length priee 
may  readily  be  found  in  a  comparable  transaction  undertaken  by 
comparable  independent  enterprises  under  similar  circumstances.I33' 
Having said this,  it should nevertheless  be mentioned that there are 
important  cases  in  which  the  arm's  length  principle  is  extremely 
challenging to  apply.  For example,  one would face  great difficulty  to 
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establish  benchmarks  when  multinational  enterprise  groups  deal  in 
integrated production of highly specialized goods, in unique intangibles, 
and/  or  in  the  provision  of  specialized  services  where  comparable 
benchmarks are difficult to find.l34 
In  certain  cases,  the  arm's  length  principle  may result in  an 
administrative  burden  for  bath  the  taxpayer  and  the  tax 
administrations,  evaluating  significant  numbers  and  types  of cross-
border transactions.13s The tax administration frequently have to engage 
in the verification process a number of years after the transactions have 
taken place, having to review any supporting documentation prepared 
by the taxpayer in arder to show that its transactions are consistent 
with the arm's length principle. Moreover, the taxman may also need to 
gather  information  about  comparable  uncontrolled  transactions,  the 
market conditions at the  time that the transactions in question took 
place for numerous and varied transactions. 
Needless to say that such an undertaking usually becomes more 
difficult  with  the  passage  of  time.  Bath  tax  administrations  and 
taxpayers  often  have  difficulty  in  obtaining  adequate  information  to 
apply  the  arm's  length  principle,  since  the  latter usually  requires  a 
comprehensive  evaluation  of bath the  uncontrolled  transactions  and 
business  activities  of independent enterprises,  comparisons with  the 
transactions and activities of associated enterprises, clearly calling for a 
substantial amount of data. The challenges do not limit themselves to 
the data collection, as the accessed information may be incomplete and 
difficult  to  interpret.  Distant  geographie  locations  of  the  data  or 
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uncooperative  parties  who  possess  it  just  add  to  the  compound 
difficulty.  By  the  same  token,  it  may  not  be  possible  to  obtain 
information  from  independent  enterprises  because  of  confidentiality 
concerns, or as it is sometimes the case, relevant information about an 
independent enterprise may simply no longer exist, or in fact there may 
simply be no comparable independent enterprises. Despite all of these 
relative  disadvantages,  the  arm's  length  principle  remains  the  main 
evaluation mechanism used worldwide to establish transfer priees. 
An important and growing issue of transfer pricing is with the 
transfers to rights to intellectual property.l36  For many goods available 
on the market, there are similar products sold or other methods that 
can be  used to  determine whether priees  are  set appropriately.  New 
inventions  and  new  drugs  however,  tend  to  have  no  equivalents, 
making this comparison very difficult. Therefore, intangibles represent 
particular problems for policing transfer pricing. It is important to note 
that investment in intangibles is favourably treated in the United States 
because  costs,  other  than  capital  equipment  and  buildings,  are 
construed as expenses for  research and development,  which are  also 
eligible for a tax credit.J37  In addition, money spent on advertising aimed 
to establish brand names is also tax deductible. 
Overall, these treatments tend to produce an effective low, zero, 
or negative tax rate for  overall investment in intangibles, thus offering 
companies worldwide a  significant ineentive to make these investments 
in the United States. Transfer pricing rules with respect to intellectual 
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property are further complicated because of cost sharing agreements, 
where  different  affiliates  contribute  to  the  cost.13s  If an intangible  is 
already partially developed  by the parent firm,  affiliates  contribute a 
buy-in  payment.  In  summary,  it is  very  difficult  to  determine  arms-
length pricing in these cases where a  technology is partially developed 
and there is risk associated with the expected outcome.J39 
2.2.2  The Functional Analysis: the Starting Point 
Regardless  of  what  transfer  pricing  method  is  selected,  the 
starting  point  in  transfer  pricing  affairs  is  always  the  functional 
analysis,  which  helps  to  identify  and  understand  the  intra-group 
transactions,  to  have  a  basis  for  comparability,  to  determine  any 
necessary adjustments to the comparable transactions and to check the 
accuracy  of  the  method  selected.14o  The  major  components  of  a 
functional analysis are performed functions, undertaken risks, used or 
contributed  assets.  ln  today's  world,  in  a  multinational  group, 
operations  tend  to  be  more  integrated  and  functions  and  risks  and 
assets are  often shared. The  functional  analysis  provides  answers  to 
identify which function's risks and assets are attributable to the various 
related  parties.  The  functional  analysis  indu  des  reference  to  the 
industry  specifies,  the  contractual  terms  of  the  transaction,  the 
economies circumstances and the business strategies. Furthermore, it 
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helps to identify if the operations are complex enough to justify a higher 
level  of profit,  or  whether  they  are  more  limited  and  consequently 
generating a lower profit.I41 
Once the functional analysis is performed and the functionality 
of the entity has been completed, it can be ascertained what transfer 
pricing method is most suitable to determine the arm's length priee for 
the  transactions  under  the  review.  Whatever  the  transfer  pricing 
method  is  chosen,  it is  necessary  to  have  access  to  information  on 
comparable  transactions  and  it is  precisely  due  to  the  difficulty  m 
obtaining  access  to  reliable  data on  comparable  companies,  that  in 
certain instances other methods than those that would seem initially 
preferred and most reliable may need to be resorted to. 
2.2.3  Transfer Pricing Methods 
There are five  major methods which are recognized by the OECD 
to establish whether the conditions imposed in the commercial relations 
between  associated  enterprises  are  consistent with  the  arm's  length 
principle.  In  tum,  these  methods  are  subdivided  in  two  major 
subgroups:  traditional  transaction  methods  and  transactional  profit 
methods.  Traditional  transaction  methods  embody  the  comparable 
uncontrolled priee method, the CUP method,  the resale priee method, 
and the  cast plus  method.  Transactional  profit methods  include  the 
transactional  net  margin  method  and  the  transactional  profit  split 
method.I42  Each  method  has  its  own  strengths  and weaknesses  and 
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whether the method is appropriate or not is determined by the nature of 
the controlled transaction,  the availability of reliable  information and 
the  degree  of  comparability  between  controlled  and  uncontrolled 
transactions. 
Traditional transaction methods are regarded as the most direct 
means  of  establishing  whether  conditions  in  the  commercial  and 
financial relations between associated enterprises are at arm's length. 
This is because any difference in the priee of a  controlled transaction 
from the priee in a  comparable uncontrolled transaction can normally 
be traced directly. As a result, if a traditional transaction method and a 
transactional  profit  method  can  be  applied  in  an  equally  reliable 
manner,  the  traditional  transaction  method  is  preferable  to  the 
transactional profit method. Moreover, if the CUP and another transfer 
pricing method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the CUP 
method is more preferable. 
Furthermore,  it  is  evident  from  the  current  guidelines  of the 
OECD on transfer pricing that there are situations where transactional 
profit  methods  are  found  to  be  more  appropriate  than  traditional 
transaction methods. For example, in cases where each of the parties 
makes valuable and unique contributions in relation to the controlled 
transaction, or where the parties engage in highly integrated activities, 
the transactional profit split may be more appropriately applied than a 
one-sided method. 
It should be noted that under the aforementioned guidelines, the 
companies are not required to apply more than one method for a  given 62 
transaction. While in sorne cases the selection of a  method may not be 
straightforward and more than one method may be initially considered, 
generally it will be possible to select one method that is apt to provide 
the best estimation of an arm's length priee. However, for more complex 
cases,  where  no  single  approach  is  conclusive,  a  flexible  approach 
would  allow  the  evidence  of  various  methods  to  be  used  in 
conjunction.l43 
2.2.3.1.  Comparable Uncontrolled Priee (CUP) method 
The  CUP  method  compares  the  priee  charged  for  property  or 
services transferred in a  controlled transaction to the priee charged for 
property  or  services  transferred  in  a  comparable  uncontrolled 
transaction in comparable circumstances.l44  If there is any difference 
between the  two  priees,  this  may indicate that the conditions  of the 
commercial and financial relations of the associated enterprises are not 
arm's length, and that the priee in the uncontrolled transaction may 
need  to  be  substituted  for  the  priee  in  the  controlled  transaction. 
Product comparability should be closely examined in applying the CUP 
method.  A  priee may be materially influenced by differences  between 
the goods transferred in the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, 
although the functions  performed and risks  assumed  (e.g.  marketing 
and selling function) are similar so asto result in similar profit margins. 
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The  CUP  method  is  appropriate  especially  in  cases  where  an 
independent  enterprise  sells  products  similar  to  those  sold  in  the 
controlled transaction.14s  If the  CUP method cannot be applied,  other 
traditional transaction methods available: the resale priee method and 
the cost plus method. 
Transfer pricing regulations in most countries allow CUPs to be 
adjusted  if  differences  between  the  CUP  and  the  related  party 
transaction can be valued and have a  reasonably small effect on the 
price.J 46  Examples of adjustments that are  commonly allowed include 
differences in the terms  of any given  transaction  (for  example,  credit 
terms),  in sales volume,  as well  as in the  timing of the  transaction. 
Conversely,  there are differences in respect of which adjustments are 
difficult or impossible to make. These include quality of the products, 
geographie markets,  level  of the market and the amount and type of 
intangible property involved in the sale. 
2.2.3.2  Resale Priee method 
The resale priee method begins with the priee at which a product 
that has been purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an 
independent  enterprise.  The  resale  priee  is  then  reduced  by  an 
appropriate gross margin on this priee representing the amount out of 
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which the reseller would  seek to caver its selling and other operating 
expenses  and,  in  the  light  of  the  functions  performed  (taking  into 
account assets used and risks assumed), make an appropriate profit.147 
What is left after subtracting the gross margin can be regarded,  after 
adjustment for other costs associated with the purchase of the product 
(e.g.  customs duties), as an arm's length priee for the original transfer of 
property between the associated enterprises. The appropriate discount 
is the gross margin, expressed as a  percentage of net sales. It is earned 
by a  reseller on the sale of property that is bath purchased and resold 
in  an  uncontrolled  transaction  in  the  relevant  market.  Whenever 
possible, the discount should be derived from unrelated party purchase 
and sales for the reseller involved in inter-company transaction. When 
no  such transaction  exists,  an appropriate  discount may  be  derived 
from sales by other resellers in the same or a similar market.  148 
The  OECD  guidelines  recognise  that  there  are  problems  in 
obtaining comparable data,  for  example where there is a  considerable 
period of time between the comparable transaction and the one under 
review  within  the  group,  or  where  movements  within  the  economy 
generally would cause possible distortion, thus making the accounting 
consistency extremely important in applying the resale priee method. 
By  the  same  token,  the  cross  profit  margins  will  not  be 
comparable if accounting principles  and practiees  differ  between the 
controlled transaction and the uncontrolled transaction, and thus, the 
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appropriate  adjustments  should  be  performed  to  the  data  used  in 
computing the gross margin to make sure that 'similar' gross margins 
are compared. 
Product differences are less  critical for  the resale priee method 
than they are for the CUP method, merely because it is less probable 
that product differences have a  material effect on profit margins rather 
than on priee.  One would expect  a  similar level  of compensation for 
performing similar functions  across  different  activities.I49  In a  typical 
intercompany  transaction  involving ·a  manufacturer  owning  valuable 
patents  or  other intangible  properties  and  affiliated  sales  companies 
that  purchase  and  resell  the  products  to  unrelated  customers,  the 
resale  priee  method  is  a  method  to  use  if the  CUP  method  is  not 
applicable and if the sales companies  do not own valuable intangible 
properties.  The  resale  priee  method  is  also  typically  applied  in  a 
commission agent structure involving principal and related commission 
agents.  In this case,  the  resale  priee  method will  establish an arm's 
length commission to be earned by commission agents.1so 
2.2.3.3.  Cost Plus method 
The  cost plus  method  can  be  described  in the  following  way. 
There are certain costs which are incurred by the supplier of property 
(or services) to an associated purchaser. An appropriate cost plus mark-
up is then added to this cast, to make an appropriate profit in light of 
the functions performed and the market conditions. What is arrived at 
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after adding the cost plus mark-up to the above costs may be.  regarded 
as  an arm's  length  priee  of the  original  controlled  transaction.  This 
method  probably is  most  useful  where  semi-finished  goods  are  sold 
between associated  parties,  where associated parties  have  concluded 
joint facility agreements or long-term buy-and-supply arrangements, or 
where the controlled transaction is the provision of services.1s1 The cost 
plus  method  is  generally  used  in  transactions  involving  a  contract 
manufacturer, atoll manufacturer or a  low risk assembler which does 
not  own  product  intangibles  and  incurs  little  risks.  The  cost  plus 
method  is  usually  not  a  suitable  method  to  use  in  transactions 
involving  a  fully-fledged  manufacturer which  owns  valuable  product 
intangibles  as  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  locate  independent 
manufacturers owning comparable product intangibles. Therefore, as it 
is  the case with the resale  priee  method,  which is  also  premised on 
using gross margins as the basis for comparison, a  careful comparative 
review of the accounting policies is as important as the determination of 
the  markup,  particularly  with  a  view  to  identifying  any  potential 
mismatches of expense categorisation between cost of goods sold and 
administrative expenses when comparing the  financial  results  of the 
taxpayer and the comparables.1s2 
2.2.3.4  Profit Split method (residual/  contribution} 
The transactional profit split method seeks to eliminate the effect 
on  profits  of  special  conditions  made  or  imposed  in  a  controlled 
transaction  by  determining  the  division  of profits  that  independent 
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enterprises  would  have  expected  to  realize  from  engaging  in  the 
transaction or transactions.Is3 The main strength of the transactional 
profit split method is that it can offer a  solution for  highly integrated 
operations for which a traditional method would not be appropriate. The 
profit split method might be used in cases involving highly interrelated 
transactions that cannat be analysed on a  separate basis. This means 
that  the  profit  split  method  can  be  applied  in  cases  where  the 
associated  enterprises  engages  in  several  transactions  that  are 
interdependent  in  such  a  way  that  they  cannat  be  evaluated  on  a 
separate basis using a traditional transaction method. The transactions 
are  thus · so  interrelated that it  is  impossible  to  identify  comparable 
transactions. 
2.2.3.5.  Transactional Net Margin Method 
The  transactional net margin  method  examines  the  net  profit 
relative to an appropriate base (for example, costs, sales, assets) that a 
taxpayer realises from a  controlled transaction. One of the strengths of 
the transactional net margin method is  that net profit indicators  (for 
example, the return on assets, operating incarne to sales, et cetera) are 
less affected by the transactional differences in comparison with priee, 
as it is used in the CUP method.Is4  Net profit indicators may also be 
more adaptable to sorne  functional  differences between the controlled 
and uncontrolled transactions than gross profit margins. Differences in 
the  functions  performed  between  enterprises  are  often  reflected  in 
variations in operating expenses. Consequently, this may lead to a wide 
153 
154 
OECD, supra note 128 at 77. 
Ibid at 78. 68 
range  of gross  profit  margins  but  still  broadly  similar  levels  of net 
operating profit indicators. However, the use of net profit indicators can 
potentially  introduce  a  greater  element  of  volatility  into  the 
determination  of  transfer  priees  for  two  reasons.  First,  net  profit 
indicators can be influenced by sorne factors that do not have an effect 
(or have a  less substantial or direct effect) on gross margins and priees, 
because  of the  potential  for  variation  of  operating  expenses  across 
enterprises. Second, net profit indicators can be influenced by sorne of 
the same factors, such as competitive position, that can influence priee 
and gross margins, but the effect of these factors may not be as readily 
eliminated. 
Sorne methods are more appropriate and indicative to provide for 
an  arm's  length  result  for  certain  transactions  than  others.  For 
example,  a  cost  based  method  is  usually  deemed  more  useful  for 
determining an arm's length priee for services and manufacturing, and 
a  resale  priee  based  method  is  usually  deemed  more  useful  for 
determining an arm's length priee for  distribution/  selling functions.  155 
The  transactional  net  margin  method  is  typically  applied  when  two 
related parties engage in a  continuing series of transactions and one of 
the parties controls intangible assets for which an arm's length return 
is not easily determined. Since the transactional net margin method is 
applied to the party performing routine manufacturing, distribution or 
other functions that do not involve control over such intangible assets, 
it  allows  the  appropriate  return  to  the  party  controlling  unique  or 
difficult to value intangible assets to be determined indirectly. 
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2.2.4.  Recent developments in transfer prieing principles 
Since  its  inception  in  1961,  the  Organization  for  Economie 
Cooperation and Development has positioned itself as an organization 
committed to  promoting economie growth,  world trade and sustained 
rising  standards  of living.  The  organization  became  the  undisputed 
leader in shaping global values in this domain and its initiatives and 
guidelines are accepted by many countries as the standards of conduct 
in international trade. One of the first indications of the organization's 
success has corresponded with the fact that tax authorities worldwide 
started  to  pay  close  attention  to  transfer  pricing  in  the  1960s  and 
1970s. The OECD member countries recognized that it would be helpful 
to provide sorne general guidance on transfer pricing in order to avoid 
the  damaging  effects  of double  taxation.  The  result was  the  OECD 
report  and  guidelines  on  transfer  pricing whieh were  first  issued in 
1979 and were subsequently revised and updated in 1995 and again in 
2010.156 
Overall, the 2010 OECD Guidelines can be summarized by the 
following points: 
1 
2 
3 
!56 
The arms'-length principle is the fairest and most reliable 
basis for determining how profits have to be taxed; 
Preference is given to "the most appropriate method rule;" 
The Transactional net margin method is considered to be 
on an equal footing with  other transfer pricing methods 
and detailed guidance is  provided on  the use of profit level 
indicators; 
OECD, supra note 129. 4 
5 
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70 
Additional emphasis is placed on the profit split method, 
which is suggested to be the most appropriate method for 
transactions involving "unique intangibles;" 
More emphasis is placed on data analysis and the use of 
adjustments and statistical methods to draw conclusions; 
A nine-step process is introduced for the establishment of 
transfer pricing policies and procedures; 
Having  said  this,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  as 
comprehensive  as  they  seem,  the  OECD  principles  are  subject  to 
commentary  and  review  by  other  competent  bodies,  such  as  the 
Multistate  Tax  Commission  (hereinafter  MTC) ,  which  in  2010  has 
issued  recommendations  to  the  transfer  pricing  principles  which 
acknowledge the changing and more complex profile of today's economie 
transactions,  particularly  in  the  area  of intangibles,  and  signal  the 
noticeable  shift of profits  to  low  tax jurisdictions  by companies with 
significant intangible property rights.1 s7  As such, speaking of the United 
States, the MTC points out that in addition to its main damaging force 
of eroding the.  tax base of the country, income-shifting practices, which 
stem out the transfer pricing dealings, prove to cast taxpayers further, 
given the "protracted  and expensive litigation yielding highly uncertain 
result" that they bring out.1ss  Having said that, it should be pointed out 
that in the face of the multitude of transactions between a whole host of 
inter-linked  market  players,  many  state  legislatures  have  initially 
conceded defeat in being able to systemically deal with these practices, 
but that with the adoption of combined  reporting systems, the situation 
has improved. 
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2.2.5.  Monitoring transfer pricing compliance 
Many  tax  authorities  require  taxpayers  to  complete 
contemporaneous documentation containing detailed information about 
their transactions with related parties. Although specifie requirements 
vary by jurisdiction, most contemporaneous documentation includesis9: 
•  A description of related-party transactions; 
•  An analysis  of the func"tions  performed by each party to 
the transactions; 
•  An  evaluation  of the  possible  transfer  pricing  methods 
which could have been used; 
•  Why the selected transfer pricing method was chosen, an 
economie  review  of  the  arm's-length  nature  of 
intercompany transactions; and 
•  An  assessment  of  conditions  and  assumptions  which 
could have affected the pricing analysis. 
Different  tax  authorities  require  the  submission  of  this 
documentation  at  various  times.  Sorne  may  have  a  mandatory 
submission  date  for  all  taxpayers  with  related-party  transaction 
magnitude  over a  certain threshold,  while  others request submission 
along with taxpayer's annual tax fillings. Other tax authorities may only 
require submission of contemporaneous documentation when specially 
requested  by  the  authorities,  while  others  may  not  require 
contemporaneous documentation at all. 
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Companies that disregard documentation requirements or fail to 
priee  transactions  with  related  parties  at  arm's  length  face  the 
possibility of a  transfer pricing investigation and audit. Audit practices 
vary by jurisdiction;  however,  most involve  additional documentation 
and records to support the arm's length principle. If the tax authority 
determines that a  taxpayer's pricing scheme is unsuitable, additional 
tax interest and penalties may be levied on the adjustments. 
2.2.6.  Transfer Pricing Dispute Resolution 
Since there is no absolute rule for determining the right transfer 
priee  for  any  kind  of  international  transaction  with  associated 
enterprises,  whether  it  involves  tangibles,  intangibles,  services, 
financing  or  cost  allocation  arrangements,  there  is  an  enormous 
potential for disagreement as to whether the correct amount of taxable 
income has been reported in a  particular jurisdiction.16o Tax authorities 
are  to  sorne  extent  in  competition  with  their  counterparts  in  other 
foreign countries to secure what they perceive to be their fair share of 
taxable  profits  of multinational  enterprises.  This  frequently  leads  to 
double taxation of the same profits  by tax authorities of two or more 
transacting countries. As  a  result, there is an increasing trend towards 
tax  authorities  favouring  the  use  of  bilateral  advance  pricing 
agreements.161  Another trend is the rise in the number of disputes going 
to the competent authorities for resolution under the mutual agreement 
procedures  of  bilateral  tax  treaties.  An  Advance  Pricing  Agreement 
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(hereinafter APA)  is a formai ruling between one or more ta:x  authorities 
and  the  ta:xpayer.  APAs  address  the  selected  transfer  pricing 
methodology to be used in pricing specified related-party  transactions 
over a defined period of time. Ta:xpayers benefit from APAs because they 
reduce the risk of future  income assessment adjustments, while they 
can help the ta:x  authority to understand ta:x-related issues  within the 
ta:xpayer's industry and ensure dependable future ta:x revenues. In fact, 
global firms like Ernst & Young, issue Client guides  to a  successful APA 
signing,  signaling  their  ever  rising  popularity.  In  fact,  in  a  2010 
presentation prepared by  Miller  Williams,  partner of Ernst  &  Young's 
National Transfer Pricing Group's  division, it has been stated that the 
global enforcement of transfer pricing is on the rise and APAs have been 
hailed as means to reduce internai transfer pricing control mechanisms, 
as  well  as  those  "[preventing]  exposure  to  material  weakness  in 
ta:xpayers' financial statements."I62 
2.2.7.  General  Transfer  Pricing  Trends  in  Canada and  in  the 
United States of  America 
Transfer pricing rules have recently been introduced or reformed 
in a number of countries, while many other countries are in the process 
of reviewing the effectiveness of their existing transfer pricing rules and 
practices. 
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2.2.7.1  Introductory remarks 
Transfer pricing is one of the highest priority issues for the tax 
authorities in both the U.S. and Canada. Transfer pricing investigations 
and  enforcement are  one  of the  major concerns  of Internai  Revenue 
Service (hereinafter IRS) in the United States while it conducts audits of 
multinational companies. More specifically, in the U.S. the focus is on 
the transfer of intangibles with a  particular emphasis on cost sharing 
arrangements.  Intercompany  services  also  continue  to  come  under 
increasing scrutiny in the U.S. as a  result of new regulations finalized 
in 2009.163  Fort its part, Canada continues to justify its reputation as 
one of the countries with the toughest transfer pricing audits. Canadian 
companies have seen audit adjustments that slash royalties and require 
levels of operating profit on the assumption that the Canadian market 
has  unique  characteristics  that  would  garner  substantial  profits  at 
arm-s length. 
On the litigious playfield, subject to a  variety of reactions from 
different commentators, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)  seemed to 
have  scored a  major victory in 2008 when it won its transfer pricing 
case  before  the  Tax  Court  of  Canada  against  the  enterprise 
GlaxoSmithKline for over 50 million Canadian dollars in pricing of active 
ingredients).164  However, just a year later in 2009, the CRA has suffered 
a  major blow when it has lost its case against General Electric Capital, 
for over 136 million Canadian dollars and before the same Tax Court of 
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Canada on the issue of guarantee fees. 16s Subsequently, the matter was 
heard on appeal and the Federal Court of Appeal has ruled in favour of 
General Electric Capital by affirming the Tax Court of Canada decision. 
The  following  year,  in  2010,  the  CRA  has  again  found  its  position 
scrutinized yet again when the Federal Court of Canada has issued a 
decision in GlaxoSmithKline case, proposing to send the matter back to 
the Tax Court of Canada for redetermination. The permission to appeal 
has  been  sought  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  in  the 
GlaxoSmithKline case, and the memoranda of both parties are available 
on the Supreme Court of Canada website.J66 
Needless  to say,  this case will be a  perfect opportunity for  the 
highest court in the country to take a  clear judicial stance in the way 
multinational companies who conduct sorne of their affairs in Canada 
deal with transfer pricing concerns.  However,  it should be added that 
even if the decision is detailed enough and manages to leave room for 
interpretation for the cases that find themselves at the periphery of the 
questions posed in GlaxoSmithKline, it is not unforeseeable that due to 
the fact that the  matter is  sufficiently complex,  there will  always  be 
room for distinguishing subsequent case law, thereby leaving room for 
nuanced, lengthy and costly litigation. 
Just south of the border, in the U.S., the IRS is making efforts to 
improve  the  assessment  process  through  increased  communications 
and  transparency.  The  IRS  has  launched  its  Quality  Examination 
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Process, which will focus on communication, interaction and timeliness 
to  achieve  taxpayer  and  IRS  goals  of early  and just  resolutions. J67 
Having  said  this,  the  IRS  has  been  less  successful  on  underlying 
substantive issues related to cost-sharing. For example, in a case before 
the  9 th  Circuit Court of Appeals  against a  company called Xilinx,  the 
attorneys for  the company have managed to  establish that under the 
old cost-sharing regulations, any cost of stock-based compensation did 
not need to be included in the computation of shared costs, ultimately 
closing  the  door  for  IRS  penalties  to  other  companies  in  similar 
circumstances. Similarly, in its trial against Veritas Company before the 
U.S. Tax Court, the IRS was unsuccessful in demonstrating under  the 
old  cost-sharing  regulations  that  certain  intangible  property  had  a 
perpetuai useful life and that selected transfer pricing methodology was 
not the best method.16s  Both the Xilinx and  Veritas decisions are now 
final. 
From  these  oases,  one  can  conclude  that  litigation  is  not  a 
satisfying remedy.  Furthermore,  even with the accumulation of court 
decisions, certainty in determining transfer priees is just as elusive as it 
was  several years ago.  It  is  expected that ênforcement and resulting 
adjustments will simply continue to rise in the years to come. That is 
indeed why improving the mechanisms to resolve double taxation is so 
important. The  binding arbitration feature  of paragraphs  6  and  7  of 
Article XXVI  of the U.S. - Canada treaty is  going to assist with solving 
more cases and will do so much faster than if a litigious route is opted 
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for. l69  Rather than letting cases go to arbitration, the Canadian and U.S. 
competent authorities will find ways to resolve their differences within 
the  two-year limit set by the  binding arbitration rules.  By the same 
token,  the  accelerated  competent  authority  procedure  (hereinafter 
ACAP)  is another mechanism that is expected to grow substantially in 
popularity.17o  The  ACAP  has  been available  between Canada and the 
U.S. since 200'5, but it is only recently that-the CRA has published a set 
of guidelines for it. It seems that APAs will continue to play their role as 
the best mechanism to ensure certainty for future transfer priees. 
2.2.7.2.  Canada and the U.S.:  comparing stances 
Canada  and  the  United  States  both  have  transfer  pricing 
legislation that is  generally  based on the  transfer pricing  guidelines 
published by the OECD. While the fundamental principles employed by 
both countries are similar, there are sorne differences in their legislation 
and the general assessing practices by their tax authorities. 
Although  the  arm's  length  concept  and  the  transfer  pricing 
principles in Canada and the United States are similar, differences exist 
in  the  way  the  Canadian  and  U.S.  tax  authorities  apply  these 
principles. In general, documentation prepared for  Canadian purposes 
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is  not  necessarily  acceptable  for  US  purposes  and  vice  versa.  As 
Canadian  corporate  incarne  tax  rates  continue  to  fall  while  U.S. 
corporate  tax  rates  remain  relatively  constant,  more  multinational 
enterprises  will  consider  cross-border  planning  opportunities  and 
reorganizations  involving  Canada  and  the  United  States.  Thus,  the 
transfer pricing audit risk in Canada is expected to remain high. 
The body of case law involving transfer pricing of each country is 
also growing. In Canada recent case law has focused on guarantee fees, 
the  pharmaceutical industry, and marketing intangibles.  Recent U.S. 
case law has focused on cost-sharing agreements, buy-in payments and 
the inclusion of stock-based compensation in charges to foreign related 
parties. The arm's length concepts in Canada and the United States are 
generally consistent with each other and with the arm's length principle 
as stated in Article  9  of the OECD's  ModeZ  Tax Convention.  However, 
there are differences in how the two countries apply the principle. 
Following the North American Free Trade Agreement trail to the 
south,  it should be noted that in Latin America transfer pricing rules 
are  still  relatively  new.  The  positions  of the  various  tax  authorities 
around transfer pricing are still developing. The international standards 
which are promoted by OECD have been adopted by all Latin American 
countries with exception of Brazil. Such countries as Chile, Colombia, 
Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Peru,  Uruguay  and  Venezuela  have 
adopted  OECD  transfer  pricing  standards  as  guiding  rules  in 
intemational trade.m 
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2.2.8.  The  How-To  Guide  to  an  audit-free  inter-company 
transfer pricing transactions 
In  order  to  minimize  transfer  pricing  audits  and  possible 
penalties from tax authorities a  company can mitigate associated risks 
by  implementing  a  well-planned  transfer  pricing  policy.  There  are 
several stages in policy development which a  multinational enterprise 
should follow in achieving this goal. Arm's length pricing which is based 
on market priees should be introduced and maintained as a benchmark 
in dealing with associated parties. It can be clone  only if a  functional 
analysis  is  performed  to  identify  which  party  is  responsible  for 
manufacturing,  research  and  development,  materials  purchasing, 
logistics, sales, distribution, marketing, etc. Once these details become 
known, the entities can be characterised accordingly and the analyst 
may look to comparable companies operating independently in the open 
market in order to set similar priees. The next step is to determine the 
method to be used for transfer pricing within a multinational enterprise. 
It can be  attained  by gathering all  relevant facts  and circumstances 
surrounding particular inter-company transactions. Functional analysis 
is a method of finding and organizing facts about a business in terms of 
its functions, risks and intangibles in order to identify how these are all 
allocated  between the  companies  involved  in  the  transactions  under 
review. 
To  obtain a  comprehensive understanding of these  facts,  it is 
necessary  to  gather  information  from  numerous  sources.  Opera  ting 
employees within the multinational must be interviewed to  obtain in-80 
depth information of each legal entity.112  These interviews will  help to 
identify  further  areas  for  review  including  relevant  contracts  and 
financial data. Key employees from each entity should be interviewed to 
determine  the  inter-company relationship  which in turn will  help  to 
determine  the  most  appropriate  transfer  pricing  policy.  On-site 
interviews are preferable to questionnaires. Questionnaires are subject 
to many interpretations and make it impossible to determine the tone of 
the response. Furthermore, industry experts and publications must be 
consulted  to  understand  standard  operating  practices  within  the 
industry as well as the relative values of the intangibles involved in the 
transaction.  Information  on  trade  associations,  competitors,  and 
academies  should  be  taken  into  consideration  to  learn  as  much  as 
possible about the company, its industry, its products and the markets 
it serves. 
In addition to the fact that considerable time should be allocated 
to the analysis of risks of various kinds because a significant portion of 
the rate of return is based on associated risk incurred.  For instance, 
market risk relates  to  the potential loss that may be associated with 
selling in an uncertain marketplace.  If a  parent company has  made 
arrangements to  protect its manufacturing subsidiary so that it does 
not incur operating losses if it encounters adverse market conditions, 
then the subsidiary should sell to affiliates at considerably lower priees 
than if it bears the full risk of market fluctuations.173  Other important 
risks include  defective  product,  warranty and environmental risks.  If 
the product is returned as defective by the final customer, for instance, 
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who bears the cost of that return? ls it the company that distributed the 
product or the foreign manufacturer? Who bears the warranty costs? If 
an environmental accident occurred at the manufacturing subsidiary, 
which  party  would  bear  the  cost  of  the  clean-up?  With  increased 
attention being paid worldwide to environmental problems in virtually 
every industry, it is becoming increasingly important to develop a  clear 
understanding of which party assumes this risk and how these risks 
vary across countries. 
Another  crucial  aspect  in  determining  appropriate  transfer 
pricing policy lies in valuation of intangibles.  Intangibles are ordinary 
divided  into  two  categories:  manufacturing  and  marketing.114 
Manufacturing  intangibles  are  characterised  as  one  of  two  types  -
patents or non-patent technical  know-how - and arise  out of either 
research  and  development  activity  or  the  production  engineering 
activities.  Marketing  intangibles  include  trademarks,  corporate 
reputation, the distribution network and the ability to provide services 
to customers before and after the sale. lt is not necessary that the asset 
appears on the balance sheet for it to have significant value for transfer 
pricing purposes. It must be determined which intangible assets play a 
role  in the  transaction under consideration,  as  well  as  their relative 
values. 
Many  MNEs  responding  to  the  globalisation  of business  have 
centralised certain support services in an attempt to minimise costs. In 
various  situations  support  activities  can  be  placed  in  low-tax 
jurisdictions  to  reduce  the  total incarne  subject to  tax in higher tax 
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jurisdictions. Support activities such as accounting and marketing can 
be centralised in a low-tax jurisdictions and affiliates can be charged for 
the  services rendered. Typically,  these entities are limited to charging 
their  costs  plus  a  markup.  In  practice,  the  absence  of  good 
communications and an appropriately qualified workforce is often a real 
barrier to shifting important support functions to pure tax havens. 
Contemporaneous documentation is crucial in order to prove to 
the tax authorities that a transfer pricing policy is arm's length. ln other 
words,  if  a  company  can  show  what  its  policy  was,  how  it  has 
interpreted that  policy  and why  the  priees  chosen  satisfy  the  arm's 
length standard, then the tax authority has little choice but to accept 
the policy. Companies that have not properly documented their policies 
are likely to face severe problems in the context of an intensive transfer 
pricing audit. 
There are many ways to check the reasonableness of a  transfer 
pricing  policy,  all  of which  compare  certain  financial  ratios  for  the 
related  party  transaction  with  their  counterparts  in  the  industry  in 
which the multinational trades.17s  Financial ratios that are selected are 
determined by the availability of reliable data as well as the particular 
facts of the transaction under review.  For example, in sorne situations, 
a  review of gross margins, operating margins and profit splits would be 
sufficient.  In  other  situations,  a  review  of  return  on  assets  and 
operating margins  may be appropriate.  The  decision  regarding which 
ratios to examine must be made on a  case-by-case basis, taking into 
consideration all the relevant facts. 
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A  transfer  pricing  guidelines  are  detailed  descriptions  of the 
various  inter-company  transactions  that  exist  within  the  group, 
together with the methods by which transfer priees will be determined 
for  each of those transactions.  Inter-company legal agreements are  a 
method of formalising the relationship between affiliated companies and 
might  include  distribution  agreements,  license  agreements,  contract 
research and development (hereinafter R&D)  agreements.I76  Each inter-
company  relationship  that  gives  rise  to  a  transfer  priee  should  be 
documented through a  legal agreement. The functional analysis should 
be documented so that it can be provided at the time of a  tax audit. In 
addition, memoranda that set out the functional analysis are extremely 
valuable to a company that is preparing for an audit or re-evaluating its 
policy. All  information gathered about comparables should be retained 
in a useful form so that it can be referred to in presenting explanations 
to  the  tax  authorities.  Updates  of  financial  statements  from  those 
comparables should be  collected annually to  be  sure that the  priees 
applied  continue  to  reflect  the  arm's-length  standard.  The  income 
statements  prepared as  part of the  analysis  should be  retained  and 
updated at least annually to show the reasonableness of the policy. 
2.2.9.  Implementing a transfer pricing policy 
There  are  many  reasons  for  implementing  international 
principles,  and  the  OECD  emphasizes  the  importance  of  a  unified 
stance throughout their publications. As  such it has been stated that 
the alignment of domestic transfer pricing rules with the internationally 
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accepted principles set forth in  the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
can: 111 
•  Provide countries with the tools they need to fight artificial 
shifting of profits out of the  ir jurisdiction MN Es; 
•  Provide  MNEs  with  sorne  certainty  of treatment  in  the 
country concerned; 
•  Reduce the risk of economie double taxation; 
•  Provide  a  level  playing field  between countries,  which is 
less likely to distort the pattern of international trade and 
investment 
•  Provide  a  level  playing  field  between  MNEs  and 
independent enterprises doing business within a country 
Having said this, the implementation is  the hardest part of the 
determination  of an  appropriate  transfer  pricing  policy.  Calculating 
transfer priees  and establishing the  controls  necessary to  be  certain 
that the priees are not changed without prior notification can be time-
consuming. Monitoring the application of the policy is important so that 
the taxpayer knows when facts have changed and no longer support the 
existing pricing structure.  Regular re-evaluation of the  facts  and the 
priees  is  advisable  to  determine  that  they  are  still  at  arm's  length. 
Practically speaking, the policy should be examined quarterly until it is 
clear  that  it  is  working.  After  that,  semi-annual  examinations  are 
usually sufficient. Financial ratios and profit splits should be calculated 
and examined to ensure the policy is producing the anticipated results. 
If it is not possible to achieve, the reasons for this should be determined 
and the appropriate adjustments made.11s 
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BATILING THE BAD APPLES: ILLICIT USES OF TAX HAVENS BY 
CORPORATIONS 
In the previous part of this work, particularities of profit shifting 
techniques  by  companies  were  discussed in great detail,  but in this 
final  part,  it would  be  worthwhile  to  explore  the larger predicament 
posed  by these  techniques,  as well  as  to  elaborate  on the  notion of 
banking secrecy and to explore how corporate identities and corporate 
structures  within  the  offshore  zones  are  used  to  accomplish  illicit 
activities, which could not be financed otherwise. 
3.1  Banking Se  crecy 
Prior  to  discussing  to  discussing  the  intricacies  of  financial 
planning in large corporations, it would be worthwhile to examine one 
of the main reproaches directed at tax havens in the populist thinking, 
which was briefly addressed in the first part of this work: the shroud of 
secrecy tha.t surrounds the financial  activities within their territories. 
Banks play the instrumental role in these operations and the banking 
duty of confidentiality has long been the cornerstone guarantee for the 
successful  commercial  planning.  Along  with  other  laws  aimed  at 
attracting foreign investors, banking secrecy  laws  enacted in  most tax 
haven jurisdiction play  a  key role  in insuring customer satisfaction. 86 
Though  these laws are fervently linked to financial crime  in the mass 
media,.  it  is  common  knowledge  that  other  than  creating  possible 
channels for illegal money transfers by investors who "seek opaqueness 
...  [of the] offshore banks secrecy policy to launder money," 179  orto use 
it  for  illegal  purposes,  they  provide  opportunities  "for  legal  financial 
services  coupled  with  tax  advantages,"  for  those  seeking  the  best 
investment retum opportunity.1 so 
The most famous  guiding light on issues of confidentiality has 
been the British case of Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of 
England,IBI  which  has  since  been  applied  across  the  common  law 
jurisdictions, including most OFCs,  making it the most cited case in 
banking law. In Tournier, the British Court of Appeal has suggested that 
there  is  an implied  duty  on  the  banking  institution  not  to  disclose 
information  concerning  its  customers  to  third  parties.  And  the 
argument that is made today,  after a  plethora of chequered decisions 
have  been  drawn  up  by  the  courts,  with  the  contractual  duty  of 
confidentiality discussed in the case,  extended to  equitable and even 
statutory grounds, that the realities of globalization no longer justify the 
application of legal safeguards in Tournier, which has dealt with a  local 
breach.1 s2 
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It is interesting to note the existence of the principle of agency, 
which is arguably the cornerstone of the banker-customer relationship 
and is based on a  premise that bankers, privy to the details of client's 
affairs  have  a  duty to  protect this information to  avoid  harming the 
client, particularly vis-à-vis the competition. And indeed, this principle 
proves inapplicable, when instead of competitors, banks are faced with 
requests from foreign authorities, seeking information to convict their 
nationals for fiscal crimes or financing illicit activities; although banks 
have been taken to court many a time when they have themselves taken 
the  decision  to  disclose  information  about  their  clients  to  foreign 
authorities, many states today have overwhelmingly given an affirmative 
response to this question by setting up in place a  variety of statutory 
and judicial measures to  come to the aid of foreign investigators and 
regulators. Having said this, in the case of the American IRS,  it would 
be worthwhile to go back to the table displaying the world's tax havens 
contained in the first part of this work, to see which OFCs allow the so-
called John Doe summons.1s3 
3.1.1.  Breaking confidentiality: the Tournier legacy 
Moreover,  such disclosure  echoes  the  general  principle  law  of 
confidentiality  which  permits  disclosure  on  the  ground  of  public 
interest, and in fact,  such grounds serve as the only notable exception 
to Tournier,  also being referred to in the obiter dicta in the case itself.IB 4 
However, as straightforward as the statutory exceptions  to the banker's 
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duty of confidentiality may sound, there are more judicial hurdles that 
need  to  be  addressed  prior  to  raising  the  glass  to  the  complete 
transparency of financial transactions. 
As  such,  unless  protected  by  a  statute,  whistleblowing  is  not 
tolerated  by courts,  as well  as disclosure  of client's  criminal history, 
with a distinction being made between "confiding in a  professional man 
an  intention  to  commit  a  crime  and  confessing  a  past  crime,  and 
between voluntary disclosure and disclosure under process of law."1ss 
Furthermore, despite the fact that in cases of elaborate fraud,  courts 
have considered that public interest in disclosure than in maintaining 
of confidenti~ity (albeit with a  message that the balancing act needs to 
be  performed  by  courts),1s6  sorne  common  law judges  have  taken  a 
different direction. Namely, several British courts, as well many courts 
found  in  offshore  jurisdictions,  systematically  issue  injunctions 
precluding the  production of bank documents  to  foreign  authorities, 
particularly  in  tax  matters,  where  the  client's  wrongdoing  is  less 
evident.1s1  Overall,  there's  a  lack  of homogenous  interpretation  and 
sorne would even say, confusion in the application of Toumier's public 
interest exception, with banks being reluctant to rely on this principle 
alone  in  disclosing  any  information.  In  fact,  in  the  absence  of 
authoritative precedents banks are reluctant to make disclosures even 
in the presence of anti-money laundering laws that impose a  statutory 
duty to report any suspicious activities. Even though most jurisdictions 
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have  adopted  such  initiatives,1ss  their  practical  implementation, 
particularly among the OFCs, is to be desired. 
3.1.2.  Recent blows to the Swiss secrecy standard 
Departing from the British model, it can be said that the banking 
secrecy laws of most tax havens have originally been held to the ante of 
the  Swiss  standard,  with  its  famous  numbered  account,  but unlike 
Switzerland, which required at least two banking officiais knowing the 
true identity of the numbered account holder, the laws got even  looser, 
as in the case of Austria, for example, where no one is required to know 
(and thus disclose) the identity of such a  holder. 189 The Swiss standard 
also applies to the sanctions on the unauthorised disclosure of banking 
information, so vitally required to assist other states in monitoring the 
activities of its residents, thus allowing the banking secrecy laws to be 
"identified by international organisations and national govemments as 
the greatest single obstacle to fighting transnational crime." 190  In fact, 
as it was previously stated in this work, such a  disclosure on behalf of 
bankers  privy to the customer's  information would result in criminal 
sanctions.19 1  And  going  back  to  the  ideas  of  sovereignty,  corporate 
identity and residency requirements discussed in the first part of this 
work, it would be appropriate to underline once again the enormously 
important precedents, set by  the British and Swiss courts in the last 
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quarter of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, whereby non-
residents' assets were granted protection of local laws,  particularly in 
the area of taxation and of banking secrecy. In fact, when it cornes to 
foreign assets, the Swiss have followed the British trailblazing example 
of accepting the location of intangible assets according to the where the 
transaction physically takes place.192 
Having said  this,  it  is  particularly interesting  to  see  how  the 
times  have  changed  and  how  under  the  guise  of  international 
cooperation,  govemments  succeed  m  getting  the  confidential 
information on the  finances  of its  residents.  The  glowing example  of 
such an intervention is the case of the Union Bank of Switzerland AG 
(hereinafter UBS),  briefly mentioned in the first part of this work. To 
date, this intervention has been one of the largest in history, as the U.S. 
govemment has been pressuring the financial institution to release the 
statements for over 52,000 of its citizens suspected of tax evasion and 
in  the  end,  has  managed  to  receive  information  on  4,400.193  It is 
interesting to note that the bank, as it was noted by the courts,194  has 
actively  marketed  the  Swiss  banking  secrecy  in  the  U.S.  and  its 
employees have routinely aided their American clients to set up shell 
companies and accounts and have advised them how to conceal their 
assets from the IRS, in defiance of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (hereinafter FATCA),19s  which spells out the obligation of the U.S. 
192 
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nationals  to  report  on  certain  foreign  accounts.  Moreover,  UBS  has 
hel  ped their Ame  rie  an dien  ts 
"open  accounts  in  the  names  of  sham  entities  to  act  as  foreign 
beneficiai  owners  of the  accounts;  then,  because  the  clients  would 
falsely provide UBS with the tax form indicating ownership by a  foreign 
entity UBS was able to evade its reporting obligations to the IRS."J96 
At the same time, what is important to retain from this case is its 
limited outcome, as well as the lengthy cooperation of Swiss authorities, 
who have initially blocked the request addressed to the UBS and who, 
together with their American counterparts, have ended up agreeing to 
petition the Florida court (albeit as amicus curiae), to enforce (the John 
Doe)  summons  that  it  served  on  UBS.  Ultimately,  an  out  of  court 
agreement has  been reached,  with  summons  enforcement settled  by 
agreeing to obtain the UBS accounts through a treaty request (based on 
the 1996 Switzerland-U.S. tax treaty),197  as well as a  780 million dollar 
fine  for  the bank. And despite the fact that this case marks the first 
massive blow to the Swiss secrecy laws, due to the sheer scale of data 
handed over to a  foreign state, that prior to this had to be content with 
very limited information had only "released in very small doses, after a 
long-drawn-out procedure of "administrative  assistance",  and only in 
cases of outright tax fraud",  198 sorne view this as only a  small, elusive 
victory. 
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In fact,  a  treaty request option effectively allowed to validate the 
OECD model tax treaty, insofar as the information exchange standard, 
which  only  allows  the  exchange  of information  "when  the  inquiring 
nation knows the identity of the suspected evader, and therefore it has 
limited value in the fight against offshore tax abuses."199  Moreover, the 
U.S. has lost an opportunity to create a judicial precedent for the mass 
enforcement of John Doe  summons,  which  is  nothing but a  "court-
enforced equivalent of an automatic information exchange, described by 
the treaty."  2oo 
On the other hand, however, it is not all gloom and doom, as the 
Swiss  authorities,  thanks  to  the  negotiations  commenced  during the 
USB case  hearings,  have  committed  themselves  to  making long-term 
changes and in 2009, Switzerland was taken off the OECD's "grey" list, 
and in 2012, it has amended its  existing  1996 treaty with the U.S., 
which  has  required  the  IRS  to  provide  names  and  addresses  of 
suspected offenders  and has opted for  a  narrower definition  of what 
constitutes fraud. The  Wall Street Journal reports that under the new 
treaty the IRS  can make demands for  names' disclose for  those U.S. 
taxpayers  who  "exhibit  certain  "behavioral  patterns"  indicating  tax 
evasion under U.S.  law, such as trying to conceal the ownership of the 
account through a  trust," and to  do so even with small time players, 
such as the cantonal banks, with whom the States do not habitually do 
business. 201 
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200 
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That being said, despite this public display  of noble intentions, 
driven by fears of damaging its financial sphere, the Swiss government 
continues to negotiate with the American authorities on the subject of 
specifie Swiss exception to the application of FATCA. In fact, in June of 
2012  bath  sides  have  signed  a  joint  declaration  of  intent  for 
implementing a  simplified anti-tax evasion law,  which exempts social 
security, pension funds  and property insurance from the accord, and 
which allows  Swiss financial  institutions  to  reveal the name  of their 
American clients, only when the "Washington [asks] for legal assistance 
in  case  of  uncooperative  taxpayers",  whereby  the  data  would  be 
transferred by the Swiss banks directly to the IRS.2o2  Thus, it seems 
that, despite all the public outrage, fighting tax crimes is still "a one 
step forward,  two  steps back"  exercise,  and when speaking of public 
scrutiny of illicit banking activities, one cannat forgo  the recent HSBC 
scandai.  Forbes magazine has eloquently summed up the dilemma of 
large entities responsible for financial misconduct. That is to say, that 
unlike  wealthy  physical  persans,  who  are  susceptible  of  being 
prosecuted,  these legal persans are just "too-big-to-jail."2o3  The same 
argument can be extrapolated onto the conduct of large  corporations, 
but  unlike  financial  institutions  who  have  failed  to  do  their  due 
diligence,  which  are  discussed  under  this  rubric,  these  giants  have 
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earned a bad reputation by avoiding corporate tax, having the means to 
make  paying  taxes  more  a  matter  of corporate  social  responsibility, 
rather than  a  matter of law.  The  Starbucks  Corporation has  been  a 
shining example of such conduct and the particularities of the litigation 
surrounding it will be discussed in the last section of this paper. 
3.2 Tax trendsetting by the MNCs: profit shifting vs. tax planning 
3.2.1  Introductory remarks 
Many  transnational  enterprises  have  surfaced  in  the  recent 
decades,  spreading their branches and placing subsidiaries spanning 
several  jurisdictions,  all  with  the  sole  purpose  of  reducing  their 
operational costs and of further maximizing their profits by tapping into 
the  comparative  fiscal  advantages  of  these  locations.  These 
multinational companies are responsible for  a  mammoth share of the 
global  market  share,  and  due  to  the  sophisticated  tax  planning 
manoeuvres and profit  alloc~tion techniques, it  becomes  increasingly 
difficult to tax their enormous turnovers. The intricacy of application of 
domestic  tax  laws  to  the  large  multinationals  principally  lay  in  the 
discrepancy  of  the  application  of  specifie  terms  contained  in  tax 
statutes, ranging from what gets taxed to how and to what extent. lt 
has been shawn in the first part of this work that corporate residency of 
a  multinational  is  increasingly  hard  to  pinpoint,  given  the  national 
differences of what defines it.  In fact, it is the plurality of identities or 
absence of legal unity, long recognized by the courts that creates these 
opportunities for  the companies. This stance in international law has 95 
been exemplified on the one hand, by the Swiss banking secrecy laws, 
which  essentially extended  to  foreigners  the  protection  of the  Swiss 
state  (including from  their own governments)  by the  logic  that their 
assets  find  themselves on the  Swiss  soil,  thus meriting its sovereign 
protection; on the other hand, in an attempt to reconcile the state law 
insulation and the internationalization of capital, staring in the late 19th 
century, British courts have issued rulings recognizing and allowing the 
division  of  the  legal  unity  of enterprises,  which  were  permitted  to 
incorporate in the United Kingdom,  but carry its activities and report 
residency elsewhere.  Both of these instances have been discussed in 
the first chapter of this work. 2o4 
It should be added though, that the illusive notion of corporate 
nationality echoes one of the contentious issues of private international 
law whose quintessence is still very well illustrated by the much quoted 
case of Lauritzen v.  Larsen?os  the case, which has become a  textbook 
example  of inter-jurisdictional  conflicting  terms,  exposes  a  situation 
where severa! aspects of a  ship's legal personality have been considered 
in determining its "nationality" inter alia for the purposes of determining 
the forum for its contractual obligations.  On the facts of the case, the 
U.S.  Supreme  Court  had  to  consider  the  possibility  of  seven 
jurisdictions, reflecting the challenges posed to regulatory capacity of 
individual states in matters  of conflicting  commercial interests.2o6  By 
the same token, it is easier to understand the fiscal maneuverability of 
transnational enterprises if one acknowledges the absence of adequate 
representation of their character in distinct legal terms; after all, MNEs, 
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which have the capacity to challenge sovereign states, are much more 
than just a group of corporations, yet de jure, there is no differentiation. 
And even though most states have found ways  to limit corporate tax 
avoidance with specifie provisions in their tax codes,  "proliferation of 
tax  havens  and  the  practice  of "treaty  shopping,"  the  multinational 
enterprises have managed to obtain considerable freedom from national 
laws."2o7 
3.2.2  A growing problem 
As  earl  y  as  1994, James R.  Hines J r.,  a  prolific writer on the 
subject of international corporate taxation, has co-authored a piece that 
extensively  deals  with  the  implications  of the  offshore  behaviour  of 
American corporations. In his work, Hines explains the attractiveness of 
tax havens to American multilaterals, which use them for the purposes 
of deferring profits made in the so-called high-tax jurisdictions through 
the American system of tax credits, obtained by the parent companies 
through financial  operations with their subsidiaries.  Same as it was 
mentioned  in  the  first  part  of  this  work  under  the  rubric  entitled 
"Corporate Residency under the OECD," Hines and Rice discuss various 
ways  MNEs  profiteer from  their daughter companies, including inter-
firm credit, whereby the repayment of the interest is tax free,  transfer 
pricing,  which  allows  the  company to  shift earnings towards  a  more 
advantageous  tax  treatment,  royalty  payments  by  the  OFCs 
subsidiaries  to  parent  companies  and  dividend  deferral  (whereby 
interest is  generated  on  residual US  lax liability)  or  payment to  the 
207  Ibid. 97 
parent  company,  which  generates  indirect  foreign  credits.2oa  By  the 
same token, US companies habitually sell accounts receivable to their 
finance  subsidiary  incorporated  in  a  tax  haven.2o9  Hines  and  Rice 
conclude  their  study  by  the  affirmation  that  "American  companies 
locate a  sizeable fraction of their foreign activity in tax havens," noting 
the  particular  attractiveness  of  income  shifting  practices  for  the 
reported  earnings  of  the  US  parent  companies  into  their  haven 
affiliates,  next  to  the  overall  appeal  of  OFCs  in  terms  of  costs  of 
ordinary business operations,21 o and the  overall premise of the  study 
suggests the increase in foreign holdings of the American companies, 
already predicting the need for future legislative reforms. 
Seeing this as an ongoing problem, the United States Congress 
almost two decades later acknowledges the national losses of revenue 
from its major corporation as a  growing problem. As such, in the study 
commissioned to the US Accountability Office, which was cited earlier 
in  this  work,  the  researchers  have  looked  at the  top  100  American 
corporations, 83% of which have admitted to having significant or large 
subsidiaries in the jurisdictions commonly referred to as tax havens for 
the  2007  fiscal  year.  The  study discusses that despite  the  noble,  or 
rather,  commercially  sound  intentions  of si:mply  using  their  foreign 
subsidiaries  to  "take  advantage  of  sales  opportunities,  natural 
resources, or favorable labor conditions," companies often aggressively 
interpret  tax  provisions  to  engage  in  income-shifting  practices, 
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principally involving transfer pricing.211  These findings are confirmed by 
other  authors,  who  mention  such  MNE  tax  avoidance  strategies  as 
having their  "foreign  subsidiaries  purchase  assets  from  a  U.S.  unit, 
thereby retuming cash, but not earnings, to the U.S", as well as using 
such legislative loopholes  as having their "foreign  subsidiaries create 
and invest in U.S. special purpose vehicles," which allows them retum 
cash to the U.S. without being taxed. This is because the IRS does not 
view these vehicles  as having book value for  tax purposes, and thus 
does not view the funds transferred as repatriation.21 2 
The  aforementioned  practices  coincide  with  another  growing 
trend affecting the MNEs in the recent decades; as such, shareholders 
of many transnational firms have seen changes on the firms' balance 
sheets  when  it  came  to  cash  holdings.  In  fact,  the  cross-sectional 
variation in cash holdings, as well as assets held in cash,  have risen 
substantially  in  the  recent  years,  all,  as  sorne  would  argue,  in  an 
attempt to minimize taxes on distributed earning (such as dividends, 
retired debt of the parental company or repurchased stock), which must 
be declared and which would otherwise be taxed in the home country.213 
Thus, firms who have earned cash earned with the help of their foreign 
subsidiaries, "retain the cash rather than paying it out to shareholders 
or  paying  down  debt."214  It  is  thus  not  surprising  that  the  MNEs 
expected to pay more taxes on repatriating money held in their offshore 
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coffers,  would  report  higher  cash  holdings.  Moreover,  the  cash 
transactions, which in accounting terms pass as intra-firm no interest 
loans, allow for further tax cuts to these multinational giants, as they 
allow  them  to  play around  with  funds  between  foreign  subsidiaries, 
making cross-crediting between income types easier and allowing them 
to adjust the amount of foreign income received in non-dividend forms 
(such as the aforementioned intra-firm loans and royalties), which in 
turn "contributes  to  their control over whether or not they have net 
ex  cess foreign tax credits at the firm level.  " 215 
3.  3  The Starbucks case Barometer 
In the recent year, "scandais" surrounding taxation practices of 
powerful  conglomerates  have  been unearthed by  the  mass  media.  It 
turns out that giants like Amazon, Google, Facebook and Starbucks pay 
little  or  no  taxes  in  their  home jurisdictions,  effectively  withholding 
billions in unpaid taxes. Th.e  word scandai has been put in quotation 
marks, since there is little novelty and no illegality of such conduct, so 
much so, that these culprits of public outrage have been doing it for 
many years,  under  the  watchful  guise  of British  and  American  tax 
authorities and law-makers. In fact,  in the eyes of the law,  they have 
clone nothing wrong. All  these MNEs are guilty of is the skillful use of 
transfer pricing techniques, deferring income and arranging inter-firm 
debt  and  royalty  payments  between  their  subsidiaries  in  a  way  to 
virtually eliminate all corporate tax. The  Starbucks scandai in the UK 
215  Ibid at 2. 100 
would  be  a  perfect  illustration  to  the  loopholes  of the  OECD  Treaty 
driven system. 
The  Starbucks  affair  has  been  the  most  recent  and  colourful 
illustration of the transfer pricing techniques in action, brought to light 
through an article by the Reuters Agency, 2J6 which has highlighted how 
the global coffee giant has managed to avoid paying the UK Corporation 
Tax on the turnover of over c€1 .2 billion pounds in the UK alone for the 
past three years. The same agency has then issued  a  special report on 
the  company,  which  emphasizes  legal  tax-avoidance  tactics  used  by 
multinational companies  by loading UK  subsidiaries  with debts  from 
other  parts  of  the  business  based  in  countries  with  lower  tax 
thresholds. As  such,  Starbucks,  a  textbook example of aggressive tax 
avoidance has paid "just 8.6  million pounds ($13.9 million dollars)  in 
British corporation tax on 3.1  billion pounds of sales over  the past 13 
years."21 7 
Prior  to  addressing  the  particularities  of the  Starbucks  fiscal 
strategy,  it ·should  be  mentioned  that  the  net  result  of their  overly 
aggressive tax planning is essentially damage to their reputation, which 
has ultimately forced the company to announce in December of 2012 a 
partial  voluntary  payment  of corporate  taxes  (10  million  pounds  in 
taxes  for  the  next  two  years  notwithstanding  the  actual  profit). 
Moreover,  what  can  be  perceived  only  as  Starbuck's  greed  (as  their 
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finances  would  in  all  likelihood have  been less  news worthy,  should 
they  have  paid  more  tax,  by  lowering  inter-firm  interest  rates,  for 
example)  has sparked a  media frenzy,  which made members of their 
upper management answer sorne tough questions. In fact,  less than a 
month  following  the  initial  Reuters  article,  the  UK  Parliamentary 
Committee on Public Accounts has held  hearings  on the question of 
MNE  tax avoidance.21s  It is quite clear from reading the transcripts of 
this event that the Parliamentarians were thoroughly dissatisfied by the 
answers  given  by  the  company  representative,  particularly  when  it 
came  to  the  question  of  interest  on  an  intra-group  loan,  whereby 
Starbuck's group bonds carry a  coupon of Libor plus  1.3 percent,  as 
well as on the question of the breakdown of the company's 6% royalty 
payment. 
Going to the heart of the matter, there are severallegal avenues 
that Starbucks applied to optimize its tax burden. First, the company 
has  charged  its  subsidiaries  in  Europe,  as  well  as  their  overseas 
representatives,  a  6%  royalty  (compared  to  4-5%  for  companies  like 
McDonald's and Burger King)  of their total sales for  the use of their 
intellectual  property,  marked  by  such  attributes  as  its  brand  and 
business processes; and with  Starbucks's divisions in Europe, Middle 
East and Africa division  making $3  billion  dollars  for  the  past three 
years, this accounts for a  hefty sum.219  In addition to these revenues, 
as the example of its Germany office demonstrates, with the company is 
profiting  from  creative  accounting  manipulations,  which  allow  it  to 
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report lasses despite handsome sales figures. As  such, reporting sales 
of 117 million euros in Germany and 73 million euros in France last 
year,  it  has  also  reported  a  loss  of  5.3  and  2.5  million  euros 
respectively.  Both  offices  have  paid  no  incarne  tax  by  using  inter-
company transfers to shift profit,  the main deduction being a  royalty 
paid to the immediate parent company in the Netherlands.22o 
Thus,  these  royalty  payments  consistently eat up most of the 
company's profits and instead of going back to the head-office in the 
US, with a  35-39%  tax, they become subject to the Dutch corporation 
tax of 25%,  and even  then,  they are  infrequently paid because  of a 
loophole in European law, which was voted down in September of 2012 
by  the  European  Parliament,  albeit  by  a  vote  carrying  merely  an 
advisory power in tax matters of individual states. This loophole, which 
to needs to be unanimously changed by the member states in arder to 
change the existing situation,  allows "the transfer of such fees  within 
the  EU  without tax deductions,  but require  withholding taxes  to  be 
levied  when the  fees  are  moved outside the  EU,"  whereas under the 
Dutch tax law companies to send royalty fees earned in other countries 
on to OFCs tax free.221 
Secondly,  Starbucks  employed  inter-company  loans  to  further 
diminish  taxable  incarne,  procuring  a  double  tax  benefit,  as  the 
borrower can set any interest paid against  taxable  incarne,  and  the 
crediter can be based in a  place that doesn't tax interest. The UK tax 
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authorities comment on this  technique as common tactic for  shifting 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions.222 
Finally,  Starbucks's  coffee  beans reach its branches through a 
Switzerland-based  firm,  which  purchases  75%  of  Starbuck's  coffee 
beans.  The  Swiss  subsidiary charges  a  20  per cent mark-up on the 
coffee  for  other  Starbucks  entities,  all  whilst  being  taxed  at  5%  by 
Switzerland for trading commodities. As a result, these charges increase 
costs of goods sold and diminish taxable inc0me.223 
Noam Chomsky once said that "the general population doesn't 
know  what  is  happening,  and  it  doesn't  even  know  that  it  doesn't 
know." Now with more media campaigns like this sorne begin to know, 
and as a  result, their elective representatives begin to act. Or at least 
they say they will.  As such, only a  few  days ago David Cameron "has 
pledged  to  make  "damn  sure"  that  Starbucks"  and  other  foreign 
multinationals ... would pay their fair share in the future," accusing the 
likes  of Starbucks,  Amazon and  Google  of lacking  moral  scruples.224 
Prime  Minister Cameron has  tacitly acknowledged the  legality of the 
MNEs  actions, he has used stern rhetoric and has promised to make 
this  issue  a  priority  for  the  UK's  upcoming  G-8  presidency,  whilst 
essentially calling the behaviour of multinationals as immoral. But such 
rhetoric is not new, as the G-8 and G-20 leaders have announced their 
willingness  to eradicate  corporate tax avoidance  in the  past, without 
222 
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any concrete results to account for, as it was mentioned earlier in this 
work. 
It should immediately be  added  though,  that while  Starbucks 
has been criticized for its transfer pricing arrangements, they have also 
been  agreed  as  legal,  and  as  Sir  Martin  Sorrell  of  WPP,  a  British 
multinational advertising  and public  relations  company,  has  pointed 
out in an interview to BBC is that the like of Starbucks  "pay tax more 
out of a sense of corporate social responsibility," trying to build a global 
brand  that  would  not  upset  its  customers,  ultimately  making  "all 
contributions [made]  to  ...  stakeholders  ...  a  question of judgement."22s 
In fact Starbucks was subject to an investigation into its transfer pricing 
agreements  in  2009  and  2010,  which  according  to  Starbucks  was 
"resolved without recourse to any further action or penalty."226 
Thus notwithstanding the Prime Minister's attempt to drag this 
1ssue onto the moral playing field,  the fact remains that  Starbucks is 
well within its right to fully utilize current tax arrangements on transfer 
pricing  policies,  being  the  norm,  rather  than an  exception  between 
many other multinational companies, who use various transfer pricing 
schemes, over and above those uncovered in this case. What Starbucks 
did is completely legal, making one to rightfully expect that until there's 
a  global consensus on the alternative to transfer pricing methods that 
are to be used to counter undesirable practices used by multinational 
companies, the economie status quo will  prevail accompanied by the 
fearless discourse of academia and politicians. 
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3.4 The Future of Transfer Pricing Rules 
As it was mentioned previously, the MNEs make extensive use of 
tax  havens  for  their  business  operations  not  only  to  benefit  from 
relocation of taxable incarne away from high domestic taxes, but also to 
reduce the domestic tax burden of their foreign earnings, and as one 
author  puts  it,  "contractual  arrangements  between  related  parties 
located in countries with different tax rates offer numerous possibilities 
for sophisticated tax avoidance."22 7  However, going back to the domestic 
high-tax economies, it is interesting to point out that the reason why 
companies get away with paying little or no corporate tax is often the 
complexity of tax regulations alluded in the first part of this work; in 
the US, the cradle of large corporations, the entirety of the tax statutes 
and regulations fill  nearly 55,000 pages of text, (quite an increase from 
only 400 pages first published as a single volume in 1913),228  filled with 
favours  to  the "political donor class,"  reflecting the  complexity of the 
American economy on the one hand, but "benefiting the rich, the well 
advised and the well-connected"  on the  0ther.229  The Pulitzer winning 
author  David  Cay  Johnson,  who  has  consistently  published  on 
corporate tax avoidance,  argues in his  famous  book "Perfectly Legal" 
that one of the solutions to corporate tax abuse is sim  ply the taxation of 
companies  based  profits  as  reported  to  the  shareholders,  as well  as 
cutting out all special interest tax cuts. Moreover, Johnson argues that 
227 
228 
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MNEs should no longer be given favourable tax treatment vis-à-vis their 
domestic counterparts, saying that the former "should be required to 
pay taxes on the capital gains on the company's books [and] not on the 
gains shareholders have in their stock [as well as on the]  unexercised 
executive stock options."23o 
However,  as  the  author  himself  notes  at  several  instances 
throughout the  book,  these reforms would take a  lot of political will, 
since politics and Big Business in America are so intertwined.  In fact, 
Johnson's writings echo those of the Nobel Memorial Prize winner and 
prolific economist Paul Krugman, who also comments on inadequacies 
of the  American  taxation  system  in  his  New  York  Times  blog,  and 
incidentally, whilst discussing the implication  of the  Starbucks CEO, 
Krugman points out that though there is a lot of discourse on fixing the 
national debt situation, there is a  lack of concrete action in "averting 
the  fiscal  cliff,"  with  the  Republican  politicians  eager  to  increase 
revenue  by  closing loopholes,  "[refusing]  to  specify  a  single  loophole 
they're willing to close."231 
By the same token, Lee A.  Sheppard, a  contributing editor to the 
Forbes magazine describes America's "tax problem" by affirming that it 
is the multinational corporations that "deprive the United States of tax 
revenue,"  chiefly  through the  practice  of transfer  pricing,  which has 
become  "pejorative  for  abuse  of  separate  company  accounting  and 
230 
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fictitious corparations."232  The author extensively criticizes the existing 
OECD model convention, mercilessly dubbing it the "sorry vestige of a 
system that will  be gone in 10 years," as the multinationals from the 
BRICs  countries  will  not  follow  the  OECD  and  Europe  opts  for  the 
proposed common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB)  for affairs 
within the European Union, which stretches beyond separate company 
accounting, facilitates cross-border use of lasses and inter alia makes 
the interest paid to residents of tax havens non-deductible.233 
In  discussing  transfer  pricing,  as  most  commentators  on  the 
subject, Sheppard focuses on the arm's length principle, discussed in 
the second part of this work. The imperfection of the application of this 
principle is discussed ad nauseum by the Tax Justice network234  and is 
clearly  demonstrated  in  the  2007  discussion  paper  by  Reuven  Avi-
Yonah  and  Kimberly  A.  Clausing,  who  amply  demonstrate  that  the 
current practice  of assigning  incarne  and  expenses  geographically  is 
incongruent with today's business realities. As  such, the authors refer 
to  the  complexity  of  the  US  taxation  system  with  its  excessive 
compliance  burdens  associated  with  transfer  pricing,  cross-crediting 
and  deferrai,  as  well  as  the  difficulty  in  the  enforcement  and 
prosecution,  marked  by  costly  litigation.  Moreover,  they  argue  that 
geographically-based taxation does none other than create an artificial 
incentive for firms to set up operations in low-tax jurisdictions in order 
232 
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to  avoid  the  relatively  high  domestic  tax rate  of 35%.23s  In  arder to 
correct the situation, the authors propose replacing the current system 
with  a  formulary  apportionment  system  based  on  the  location  of 
company's  sales,  whereby  the company's  tax  base would  include  its 
worldwide  incarne,  "multiplied  by  the  share  of  its  worldwide  sales 
occurring in the United States."236  It is an interesting proposai indeed, 
and despite demanding a  serious systemic overhaul and but for such 
issues as customer mobility, interaction with existing tax treaties and 
such a  fundamental criterion as intemational cooperation in adoption 
and enforcement, it seems logistically sound, but alas remains just an 
academie theory for the time being. 
Having said this, it would be fair to note that Lee  A.  Sheppard 
also  discusses  the  formulary  appointment method in  her previously 
cited  work  whilst  arguing  the  illusory  nature  of  the  arms-length 
principle, calling it a  "pernicious fiction propagated by the OECD;" as 
such, she points out that the formulary appointment, which is cheap to 
administer, has been used within the United States for a century and in 
Europe up until the sixties, adding that Europeans will return to this 
system once they vote on the return to formulary apportionment once 
they vote in the aforementioned CCCTB.237  In fact,  the author daims 
that this move is the first amen of change, brought out by the public 
discontent with the blatant omission by the MNEs to live up to their 
235 
236 
237 
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civic  responsibilities,  adding,  however,  that  the  Big  Business  will 
continue  to  lobby  hard  in  Washington  for  the  protection  of  the 
territorial taxation, and particularly so, in the light of the prospect of 
having incarne their intangibles taxed in market countries, while their 
"R&D  expenses  are  deducted  in  the  parent's  residence  country."23s 
Finally, an interesting tangent of Sheppard's discussion deals with the 
tax havens themselves; she argues that the last nail in the coffin of the 
current  state  of  fiscal  affairs  is  the  improper  interpretation  of tax 
competition in that it should constitute competition for FDI, rather than 
for booked incarne from an intangible, since in the long run, it only the 
money passing through, without truly benefiting the OFC that stores 
it.239 
238 
239 
Ibid at 474. 
Ibid at 476. CONCLUSION 
A  company's  mantra  has  always  been  that  interests  of  its 
shareholders should prevail above all else. In the last several decades, 
the communal interest and ethical considerations have also taken the 
.front stage; and even though it is in the shareholders' best legitimate 
interest,  through  sorne  careful  commercial  planning,  to  keep  tax 
payments as low as possible, there is always  a  fine  line with what is 
perceived to be the artificial tax avoidance, which can in sorne cases 
harm the company's reputation or even be the cause for  legal action. 
Transfer pricing mechanisms, which allow the firms  to walk this line, 
have thus become one of the most important issues in the world  of 
international taxation, allowing MNEs  to save billions of dollars in tax 
revenue through the use of their foreign subsidiaries, which are often 
locatèd in tax: havens. 
Having said this, the principal attraction of tax havens and the 
main cause for their spectacular success lay in their ability to provide 
protection from national regulation and taxation without the need to 
physically relocate to the host country.2 4o The OECD requirement to use 
proper  transfer  pricing  technique  is  in  full  legal  swing  by  the 
governments, but their enforcement is difficult, particularly in cases of 
unique or proprietary items such as patent rights. Moreover, to reduce 
or  defer  tax  liabilities,  large  MNEs  can  modify  their  transactional 
framework  and  rearrange  intrafirm  debt  and  trade,  dividends  and 
royalty payments. 
240  Palan, supra note 70 at 163. 111 
And  even  through  token  witch-hunts  are  occurring,  targeting 
groups  of individual  tax  payers,  and  the  financial  institutions  that 
assist them, as it was shawn in the case of UBS and HSBC, the reality 
of major  financial  institutions  and  transnational  firms,  which  have 
powerful lobbies in their original jurisdictions and have the best legal 
minds and financiers at their disposal, is to operate in the gray zone 
known  as  sophisticated  financial  planning,  walking  the  fine  line 
between  tax  reduction  and  tax  evasion,  and  as  it  has  been 
demonstrated in this work, the example of Starbucks is by no means an 
isolated  incident  of  a  multi-jurisdictional  mammoth  machine  of  a 
company that causes  its  home jurisdiction,  the  United  States,  loose 
millions of dollars in lost revenue. Thus until the transfer pricing rules 
are  revised  to  the  point  when  companies  like  Starbucks  become 
accountable,  the OECD economies will have to be content with small 
victories, mostly over individual tax payers, as it was the case with the 
UBS;  and until the information exchange and reporting requirements 
become an obligation and are carried out automatically, that is without 
having to resort to courts, as it is envisioned in FATCA or in that well-
intended,  but  never-adopted  Stop  Tax  Haven  Abuse  Act,2 41  all  the 
initiatives are nothing but smoke and mirrors. 
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